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Abstract 
Livelihood systems of poor rural households are often so fragile that a small misfortune can 
destabilize households for years. Strategies for coping with risk include informal mutual aid 
agreements and/or formal microinsurance schemes. In developing countries, insurance 
markets are usually underdeveloped. Nevertheless, if the development path is supported by 
strong structures and institutions, anonymous markets will, over time, replace informal 
insurance networks as they are more efficient. In Vietnam, livestock is an important 
household income source and has additional non-economic functions in the households. For a 
long time, rural financial institutions in Vietnam financed only a small array of agricultural 
investments, but these frequently included livestock purchase. The absence of off-farm 
investment possibilities further promotes investment in livestock production. Failure of an 
investment, especially when loan-funded, can leave a household in an extremely vulnerable 
position. Livestock death is considered to be a major factor contributing to poverty. Farmers 
using credit to purchase livestock face two risks at once: (1) loss of the livestock due to 
disease and subsequently (2) failure of investment. Farmers would like to reduce the 
uncertainty, but a broad-based livestock insurance scheme does not exist in Vietnam. There 
are only a few formal and semi-formal schemes with very limited outreach. Thus, access to 
formal insurance is almost non-existent, and farm households have to rely mainly on informal 
mutual aid schemes within their social networks to reduce their risks. The objective of this 
paper is to contribute to the discussion on the general feasibility of a livestock insurance 
scheme in Vietnam. In this context, the demand for and supply of livestock insurance schemes 
is discussed. Quantitative (N=322) and qualitative data collection took place between 2001 
and 2004. The quantitative data comprise cross-sectional household-level data from three 
different districts in Northern Vietnam. Four different types of insurance providers were 
selected for analyzing the supply side: 1. Insurance tied to credit within a state-owned 
company; 2. Insurance tied to credit within a development project; 3. A state-owned insurance 
company (which collapsed); 4. A private insurance company. By selecting these different 
insurance providers, the range of livestock insurance types offered in Vietnam was covered. 
The main result is that provision of sustainable livestock insurance is hampered principally by 
unreliable data on livestock mortality and by premia that are set politically at a low level. 
Keywords: Vietnam, livestock insurance, microinsurance, rural finance 
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Constraints and potential of livestock insurance schemes 
- A case study from Vietnam 
Thomas Dufhues, Ute Lemke and Isabel Fischer 
1 Introduction1 
Poor rural households are vulnerable.2 Their livelihood systems are often so fragile and 
delicately balanced that a small misfortune can destabilize a household for many years. Crises 
and shocks which either require immediate outlays of cash or which diminish already low and 
irregular income, or both, can have long-term effects on livelihood strategies and welfare 
(World Bank and DFID 1999). Vulnerable households have developed sophisticated (ex-ante) 
risk-management and (ex-post) risk-coping strategies. These households may adopt 
production plans to reduce their exposure to the risk of adverse income shocks (ex-ante), even 
if this entails lower average income, or they may try to smooth consumption (ex-post) by 
creating buffer stocks.  
Livelihood strategies will differ according to whether people have to deal with gradual 
changes or sudden shocks and crises. Coping strategies (e.g. sale of livestock) seek to 
minimize the impact of livelihood shocks and are a short-term response to sudden or periodic 
shocks (Carney et al. 1999; Korf 2002). Coping strategies, although providing some 
protection in the short run, limit the poor’s long-run prospects of escaping poverty (Kanbur 
and Squire 2001). Households recover and, eventually, employ new adapting strategies to 
develop a new portfolio of livelihood activities. The revision and expansion of adapting 
strategies can include the adaptation of existing informal local mutual aid agreements and/or 
the development and adoption of formal or semi-formal microinsurance schemes for certain 
risks (Murray 2001). Adaptive livelihood strategies may seek to mitigate risks through 
livelihood adjustment (e.g. family planning or accessing insurance), or change and 
diversification of income-creating activities. However, Skees et al. (2002) state that as 
farming remains the dominant activity in many rural areas, diversification may not actually 
spread certain types of risk, a particular example being weather events that cause widespread 
loss of crops and grazing land. Moreover, the average household income in a diversified 
portfolio may be lower than in a specialized portfolio, but the variation in income is also 
normally less in a diversified portfolio. Thus, there is potential economic gain if households 
are offered policies that provide them with alternative mechanisms for reducing and managing 
risk, such as formal savings and insurance mechanisms (Dunn 1997).  
Serageldin and Grootaert (1999) state that the gradual replacement of informal associations 
and networks with semi-formal and formal impersonal market mechanisms is a good example 
for development. In developing countries, financial markets, and particularly insurance 
markets, are usually underdeveloped (Dasgupta 1999; Zeller 2000;). Thus, formal and semi-
formal insurance schemes appear to contribute only little to reducing income risk and its 
consequences in developing countries (Dercon 2002; Fafchamps 1999; Kanbur and Squire 
2001). Nevertheless, if the development path is supported by strong structures and 
                                                 
1 The research for this paper was carried out within the framework of the German-Thai-Vietnamese 
Collaborative Research Program (Sonderforschungsbereich 564) ‘Sustainable land use and rural development in 
mountainous regions of Southeast Asia’. It is based on interdisciplinary research work from the subprojects D2 
‘Efficiency of smallholder animal husbandry (Vietnam)’, F2 ‘Rural finance and sustainable rural development in 
Northern Vietnam’, and F2.2 ‘Vulnerable livelihoods and coping with risks in farm households in Northern 
Vietnam’. Funding from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), co-funding from the Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Environment of Vietnam, as well as funding from German Academic Exchange Service 
(DAAD) and the Federal State of Baden-Württemberg are gratefully acknowledged. 
2 Vulnerability refers to “the relationship between poverty, risk and efforts to manage risk” (Alwang, Siegel, and 
Jorgensen 2001: 1). 
 2
institutions, anonymous markets will, over time, replace the ‘named’ transactions within 
networks such as informal insurance networks where the number of members in each network 
is small and where members know each other personally. In this situation, participating 
individuals stand to gain from formal insurance, as access to formal insurance services has the 
potential to substitute for some higher-cost informal insurance mechanisms (Stiglitz 1999; 
Zeller 1999). Moreover, no matter how good the informal insurance mechanisms are, 
members of those networks are unable to protect themselves from covariate risks (Kanbur and 
Squire 2001).3 The poor especially have less access to informal sources of post-risk 
management if it requires time and in-kind investment (Putman 1993).  
1.1 Problem statement and objectives 
In developing countries, livestock is an important and, in some situations the only, cash-
income source. If a family loses a cow, the result may be loss of income for a considerable 
period of time (Mustaffa-Babjee, Chang and Sopian 1987). This holds true for many 
households in Vietnam’s northern provinces (World Bank and DFID 1999). Rural financial 
institutions in Vietnam for a long time financed only a relatively small array of agricultural 
investments, often including the purchase of water buffaloes or, even more frequently, the 
purchase of pigs for fattening. The absence of off-farm investment possibilities further 
promotes investment in livestock production in Northern Vietnam. There, about 60% of 
households currently invest credit in livestock production (Dufhues et al. 2002).4 Duong and 
Izumida (2002) found in a survey conducted in 1997 covering parts of northern, central, and 
southern Vietnam that 54% of formal loans were invested in livestock. These findings reflect 
the fact that investment in livestock has been a popular trend in the Vietnamese rural 
community in recent years. 
In the livestock dependent households of Northern Vietnam, too, failure of an investment, 
especially when funded by a loan, can leave a household in an extremely vulnerable position. 
Loss of livestock can have serious consequences for a rural household’s livelihood, given the 
pivotal role played by livestock in the farming systems of Northern Vietnam. Livestock death 
and disease is considered to be one of the main factors contributing to poverty (World Bank 
and DFID 1999). Farmers deciding to use credit to purchase livestock face two risks at once, 
and both severely endanger their livelihood: (1) the risk of losing the livestock asset, and (2) 
failure of their investment. Because farmers are aware of these risks, they would like to 
reduce the uncertainty (Buchenrieder, Heidhues and Dung 2003). As a formal agricultural or 
more general rural insurance market hardly exists in Vietnam (although Decree No. 42 of 
2001 calls for the development of more insurance instruments, particularly for rural areas), 
rural farm households have to rely mainly on informal mutual aid schemes within their social 
networks to reduce their risks (Vandeveer 2000). No broad-based livestock insurance scheme 
exists in Vietnam. There are only a few formal and semi-formal schemes with very limited 
outreach.5  
                                                 
3 If a risk becomes effective and creates a shock or crisis that affects just one person (one family/household), it is 
classified as an individual risk, or idiosyncratic. Covariance is the tendency for either i) many households to be 
affected by a risk at the same time or ii) several risks to consistently occur together. Covariant or mass risks 
differ crucially from individual risks: (1) they tend to be difficult or impossible to predict; (2) they affect many 
people at the same time, thus hampering the ability of risk-pooling mechanisms to protect against them; and (3) 
the cost associated with mass, covariant risks tends to be significantly greater than that resulting from other risks 
(Brown and Churchill 1999; Dercon 2002).  
4 Moreover, livestock sales are often used to repay interest and principal of loans. For instance, this research 
showed that 73% of the loans from the formal financial market in Vietnam are repaid with revenues from 
livestock production. 
5 The three existing schemes assessed have a total outreach of 4,000 households, which represents about 0.03% 
of the rural population in Vietnam. Assuming that a couple more local schemes exist, such as the Moc Chau 
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While the literature discusses crop insurance schemes and microinsurance for health and life 
in developing countries, little research has so far been conducted on livestock insurance 
schemes, and even less in relation to Vietnam. In global terms, the first livestock insurance 
scheme was established in Germany (Compensation Funds, 1909). Other developed countries 
have followed suit over time. In developing countries, animal insurance schemes have 
developed mainly in Asia, e.g. a fairly successful, credit-tied cattle insurance scheme in India 
(Otte, Nugent and McLeod 2004). The objective of this paper is to contribute to the discussion 
on the general feasibility of a livestock insurance scheme in Vietnam. Past and recent 
developments in rural insurance markets will give hints with regard to the design of livestock 
insurance schemes to solve typical insurance problems such as moral hazard and adverse 
selection. This literature review will serve as the basis for discussion of a few existing 
livestock insurance schemes in Vietnam. In this context, the demand for livestock insurance 
schemes will also be described. However, livestock insurance schemes need to be discussed 
within the framework of the underlying livestock sector and, most important, the 
veterinary/extension system, as setting insurance premia is highly dependent on the 
performance of this system. The veterinary/extension system of Vietnam is therefore 
described in detail. Particularly, the reliability of livestock risk data is discussed. At the end, a 
joint view of different disciplines is necessary to reveal the constraints to and potential for 
providing sustainable livestock insurance services in Vietnam. 
1.2 Organization of the research paper 
The second section describes the analytical methods used and the sample composition. In 
addition, the data limitations of the sample are discussed. Section three supplies the 
theoretical background for providing livestock insurance. In section four, the veterinary 
framework of Vietnam for supplying livestock insurance is analyzed. Section five first of all 
investigates the general demand for livestock insurance and then examines the supply of 
livestock insurance. The paper concludes with policy recommendation on supplying 
sustainable livestock insurance in Vietnam.  
2 Methodology and data base 
The following section starts with a description of the methodology used in this analysis. It 
then continues with a presentation of the survey sample, and concludes with some remarks on 
the limitations of the data. 
2.1 Model and data analysis 
Analytically, this contribution combines quantitative data from the household level and 
secondary and qualitative data from the supplier of livestock insurance. The main focus is on 
the supply side. 
Quantitative data: The household database is a combination of quantitative data collected in 
the animal husbandry survey and the rural finance survey. It comprises cross-sectional 
household-level data from four different districts and different ethnicities. The quantitative 
data are analyzed with regard to the demand for livestock insurance using descriptive statistics 
and a multinomial logit regression model within the methodological framework of a Conjoint 
Analysis (CA).6 
                                                                                                                                                        
dairy cattle enterprise, this figure might rise to 0.5%. However, this figure is still far from having any significant 
outreach to the rural population as a whole.   
6 Due to space limitations, and as the multinomial analysis represents only a small part of the total analysis, for 
details of the model specification please refer to Dufhues et al. (2003) and Dufhues, Heidhues, and Buchenrieder 
(2004), where the same model was used. In brief, Conjoint Analysis (CA) is a methodological approach to 
estimate consumer preferences and to design new products. Products are distinct in their attributes, whereby each 
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Qualitative data: Semi-structured and unstructured interviews with key persons such as 
officials of mass organizations or political cadres at the different administrative levels 
provided general information on the research region and on the livestock risk situation in 
general.7 Semi-structured interviews were conducted with employees of different suppliers of 
livestock insurance at all hierarchical levels (field officer to manager). These data were 
analyzed from the point of view of information economics, with a special focus on the 
principles of moral hazard and adverse selection.8 The results are then presented in four 
different key studies. 
2.2 Sampling procedure 
This research work is based on research conducted by three subprojects of one umbrella 
research program, the German-Thai-Vietnamese Collaborative Research Program 
(Sonderforschungsbereich 564) ‘Sustainable land use and rural development in mountainous 
regions of Southeast Asia’ or, in abbreviated form, the Uplands Program. Quantitative and 
qualitative data collection for the animal husbandry survey (subproject D2) and the rural 
finance survey (subproject F2) took place between in 2001 and 2003 (first phase of the 
Uplands Program), while the data collection for the vulnerability survey (subproject F2.2) is 
currently under way (2004). An overview of the complete research sample is given in Table 
12 in the Annex. The quantitative analysis, which is interpreted mainly in the section on 
insurance demand, is based on two surveys from subprojects D2 and F2.  
Four different types of insurance providers have been selected for analysis of the supply side: 
1. Insurance tied to credit from a state-owned company (Moc Chau Dairy Cattle Enterprise), 
2. Insurance tied to credit from a development project (Groupe de Recherche et d’Échanges 
Technologiques (GRET)), 3. a state-owned insurance company (BAOVIET) (which 
collapsed), and 4. a private insurance company (Groupama). The authors selected these 
insurance providers as being representative (to cover the range of livestock insurance offered 
in Vietnam) and instructive for other organizations seeking to establish or improve livestock 
insurance.  
Animal husbandry survey (D2, first phase 6/2000-5/2003): The overall objectives of this 
subproject are (1) the description of smallholder livestock production systems, with a focus on 
pigs, (2) the identification of livestock genotypes that use the scarce local resources available 
for husbandry most efficiently and that are adequately integrated into current farming 
systems, and (3) the development of village breeding programs utilizing those genotypes. 
Four villages of ethnic Black Thai, located in the Son La and Mai Son districts of Son La 
province, were selected for the sample. The villages were selected on the basis of (1) the 
intensity levels of their production systems, (2) distance to the district capital, and (3) altitude. 
Due to the research approach, household sampling was stratified. Among the sow keepers in 
                                                                                                                                                        
attribute may have different levels. The attributes/levels work as decision parameters for the potential consumer 
to purchase a product. In Conjoint Measurement, the respondents consider a product as a whole by the presented 
concepts. For further reading on CA we refer to Green and Srinivasan (1990). 
7 In Vietnam the so-called ‘mass organizations’ organize almost all people of a certain age and/or sex, e.g. 
Farmers’ Union, Women’s Union, Youth Union, and Veterans’ Union. They are hierarchically structured 
according to the administrative levels. Some of these organizations offer small loans or organize training courses 
or saving groups at village level. The Fatherland Front is the holding organization of all other mass organizations 
and also has political influence on the local people’s committees (Geppert, Buchenrieder, and Dang 2002). 
8 Opportunistic behavior is a central assumption in transaction costs economics. Williamson (1985: 47) defines 
opportunism as “self-interest seeking with guile”. Opportunism may occur ex-ante, when it is called adverse 
selection, or ex-post, when it is called moral hazard. The assumption of opportunistic behavior could be 
considered an extension to the self-interested and utility-maximizing homo economicus of neo-classical 
economic theory (Buchenrieder 2002). 
 5
each of the four villages, households with sows in late pregnancy or with suckling piglets 
were selected. Altogether, the D2-sample comprises 64 rural households. 
Rural finance survey (F2, first phase 6/2000-5/2003): The overall objective of this 
subproject is the development of client-adapted financial products and the assessment of 
credit impact on poverty. Two research sites were selected, namely Bac Kan (Ba Be district) 
and Son La province (Yen Chau district). Both provinces are located in the mountainous 
regions of Northern Vietnam and belong among the country’s poorest provinces (World Bank 
1999). The Ba Be district is a very remote area and has only recently (in 1999/2000) gained 
access to regional and interregional markets. Farmers produce mainly for subsistence. Due to 
the creation of the Ba Be National Park, huge resettlements took place and these have 
aggravated the problems in the region. The Yen Chau district has a much better regional 
market connection and is directly connected to greater Hanoi; it therefore provides a good 
contrast. 
The communes and villages were selected in accordance with pre-defined selection criteria. 
These criteria are: located on a slope, different stages of market access, ecological zones, 
ethnic minorities, different phases of the land allocation process, and one village with a high 
proportion of non-farm activities. 
The households in Ba Be and Yen Chau district were selected using a stratified sample 
according to the living standard of the population. Different wealth groups are of particular 
interest as far as their access to financial products and their preferences for financial products 
it concerns. Altogether, 260 rural households were interviewed in the two districts. 
Risk management survey (F2.2, second phase 6/2003-5/2006): The overall objective of this 
subproject is to analyze the adaptive and coping strategies of vulnerable rural households 
regarding risks. The central hypothesis of this research is that insurance has the potential to 
reduce livelihood vulnerability of poor rural households. Topical primary data will be 
collected using the same sample as subproject F2. 
2.3 Methodological constraints and data limitations 
Both surveys (rural finance survey and animal husbandry survey) used similar criteria for the 
selection of the villages, except for one single criterion: ethnic minority. Due to the small 
sample size of the animal husbandry survey, the study refrained from varying the variable 
ethnic minority. Thus, the village selection process in the animal husbandry survey resulted in 
the selection of villages all belonging to the Thai minority (which represents the majority in 
the research area). Therefore, the sample contains a bias towards the Thai minority. This bias 
was taken into account during interpretation of the data. 
The household selection differs in both surveys. The rural finance survey selected a cross 
sample from the village while the animal survey selected only households which kept certain 
genotypes of pig. Thus, a bias towards pig farmers could be assumed. However, according 
national data, 71% of all households in Vietnam keep pigs, compared to 73% in the sample 
(MARD and UNDP 2003). While there may still be a small bias in the sample concerning 
Northern Vietnam, it is rather representative as far as the whole country is concerned. 
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3 Theoretical issues of (micro) insurance 
Many households borrow, more save, and all insure. Particularly poor households enter into 
various forms of informal self-insurance or co-insurance arrangements (Zeller 2000). 
Therefore, the demand for insurance schemes is vast (ADB 2000). The following section 
provides the theoretical background on rural and microinsurance and describes past and recent 
developments in the rural insurance market of developing countries. 
3.1 The product triangle of rural finance 
Evidence from microfinance institutions (MFIs) around the world indicates that, beyond 
credit and savings products, clients have an unserved need for products to insure against many 
of the risks that they are exposed to (Buchenrieder and Theesfeld 2001). While saving was 
recognized as the forgotten half of finance in the 1980s, in the 1990s, insurance was termed 
its forgotten third (Zeller et al. 1997). 
 
Figure 1 Product triangle of rural 
finance 
Financial
Market
Credit Savings
Insurance
 
From the client’s perspective, microfinance 
products are highly convertible into each other. 
Open-access savings products and emergency 
loans can act as a form of insurance, while 
insurance products can also be used for the 
accumulation of capital. In case of credits, the 
money is collected after the disbursal of the lump 
sum, in case of savings before, and in case of 
insurances continuously (Figure 1). 
 
Savings, credits, and insurance products are closely related to each other, e.g. when loan 
defaults are tied to natural disasters, as in the agricultural sector, formal financial institutes 
(FFI) will either ration credit or build a credit premium to cover this risk (charging higher 
interest rates). Agricultural insurance increases clients’ ability to repay their loans and 
therefore, has a positive impact on default rates in the sense of reducing them. Thus, farmers 
using insurance usually have also better access to credit with good conditions (Del Conte 
2001; Skees 1999).  
The fact that the absence of insurance possibilities limits households’ ability to reduce 
consumption fluctuations does not necessarily imply that the most effective intervention 
would be to set up insurance programs (Alderman and Paxson 1992). Providing open access 
to savings and (emergency) loans may be a preferable method for helping clients to manage 
risk. Most people tend to use insurance as a last resort, after savings or credit, to protect 
themselves against risk. If potential clients of microfinance institutions (MFIs) do not yet 
have access to flexible savings and credit, providing insurance may be premature (Brown 
2000b). However, as the size of loss increases relative to a household’s expected future 
income, credit products become increasingly ineffective risk-management tools. Similarly, 
savings products offer only partial protection against risks causing large losses relative to 
household income. At this point, insurance becomes a more effective method of risk 
management (Brown and Churchill 1999). Microinsurance can be very useful in reducing the 
vulnerability of households. But to reduce vulnerability, it should be complemented by efforts 
to increase savings, build assets, and maintain strong social networks (CMF 2000b). Insurance 
cannot be the panacea for all risks faced by poor households. Some risks cannot be insured 
against and there are some risks where insurance is technically possible but may not be the 
most appropriate tool for clients to manage risk. Events that cause financial stress but occur 
with greater certainty, e.g. dowry, are better served by savings than insurance (Brown 2000a). 
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Moreover, insurance is not an appropriate tool to eradicate chronic poverty. Alleviating 
chronic poverty demands increases in the physical and human capital of the poor or in returns 
to their labor, while insurance and income-stabilization schemes are more appropriate for 
transient poverty (Kanbur and Squire 2001).  
3.2 Idiosyncratic and covariate risks 
According to Yates and Stone (1992), the critical elements of risks are potential losses, the 
significance of these losses, and the uncertainty of these losses. Risks can be divided into 
human, economic, and asset risks; some of them are associated to the idiosyncratic 
(individual) and some to the covariate risk category.9 By pooling the risk over a large number 
of people, insurance products have the potential to offer more complete protection against 
those risks and can protect households against a significant loss (relative to average income) 
at an annual cost that is within the households’ budget (Brown and Churchill 1999). However, 
not all types of risks can be insured against, i.e. only risks with a known probability of 
occurrence and a high degree of specificity are suitable for insurance (Litzka 2002). Losses 
that occur in some particular period cannot be insured against; one can only accumulate 
savings before the loss occurs or shift savings after the loss is suffered to restore the previous 
economic position. The insured losses must be probabilistic, either in terms of whether or not 
the losses will occur at all, or in terms of when losses certain to occur actually will occur (e.g., 
the moment of death). According to Vaughan (1989), an insurable risk must have the 
following four characteristics: 
1. The likelihood of the event must be readily quantifiable; 
2. The damage it causes must be easy to attribute and value; 
3. The probability of occurrence should not be too high to make the insurance 
unaffordable; 
4. Neither the occurrence of the event or the damage it causes should be affected by the 
insured’s behavior (i.e. no moral hazard).10 
While the traditional insurance literature lists a fifth characteristic (i.e., non-covariant risk), 
many catastrophic risks that are covariate are now insured by private markets (e.g. hurricanes, 
typhoons, earthquakes, floods) (Skees, Hazell and Miranda 1999). However, viable 
agricultural insurance plays only a limited role as indicated by the private sector. Private 
insurers provide health, life, and asset insurance for farmers in many countries, but they have 
been very reluctant to move into crop and livestock insurance as crop and livestock losses 
often do not fulfill the criteria above. Moreover, history has shown that government-supplied 
crop insurance schemes are a drain on public resources and need to be highly subsidized 
(Hazell 1992). Nevertheless, a similar reluctance was demonstrated by formal lending 
institutions as regards offering micro loans to peasant farmers, but this has proved to be viable 
when best practice techniques were applied.  
The risks from idiosyncratic shocks can profitably be pooled locally, whereas those from 
covariate shocks cannot. From the macroeconomic perspective, the distinction is even 
sharper. Idiosyncratic risks, whether insured or not, net out at the aggregate level, whereas 
covariate risks accumulate and so have macroeconomic effects on consumption and savings. 
From the perspective of the macro economy, it is desirable to insure covariate shocks, 
whereas the insurance of idiosyncratic shocks is rather unimportant. However, farmers are far 
more likely to insure idiosyncratic shocks than covariate shocks. Idiosyncratic shocks are 
                                                 
9 Two sources of covariate risks are common: 1) market risks and 2) natural risks (Skees et al. 2002).  
10 Moral Hazard occurs when insurants change their behavior after they purchase insurance in that way that the 
change increases the likelihood that policyholders will collect insurance indemnities (Skees 1999). 
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more common, and local informal and even private formal insurance arrangements are more 
feasible (Collier 2001).  
In covariate risks, the law of large numbers does not apply.11 Aggregating such risks would be 
unproductive, because the reserves an insurer would have to maintain would equal, or perhaps 
exceed, the reserves that individuals would have to maintain if uninsured (Priest 2003). 
Annual losses for the insurance pool will be extremely variable. The loss in any given year 
may be large enough to threaten the solvency of the insurance pool. Two techniques for 
insuring correlated losses are reinsurance and geographical spreading so that exposure is 
limited in any given geographical market (Skees 1999).  
MFIs in developing countries do not usually have the outreach to spread risks geographically. 
Therefore, Brown (2000a) strongly recommends not insuring covariate risk such as floods or 
droughts, as a single risk event can easily bankrupt the MFI. Nevertheless, private insurance, 
supplied by big insurance companies, does exists for covariate risk, e.g. for earthquakes and 
hurricanes in the US (Skees 1999).  
3.3 Traditional multiple-peril versus area-based insurance12 
Multi-peril insurance: Multiple-peril insurance schemes are usually all risk programs, 
meaning that insurance compensates all yield losses, regardless of the cause. Although 
insured risks are often enumerated, the lists of covered risks are so comprehensive that 
uninsured risks cannot be excluded in practice, including losses from bad management. One 
of the most important reasons for the failure of many traditional crop insurance schemes is 
that many risks covered by multiple-peril insurance are inherently uninsurable, leading to 
large actuarial losses for the insurer (Skees, Hazell and Miranda 1999). The uninsurability of 
many yield risks arises from moral hazard problems.13 Farmers simply have a reduced 
incentive to pursue sound farming practices if they know that any serious losses will be 
compensated by the insurer. The problem is aggravated by the practice of many state-owned 
insurers that rarely incorporate sizeable deductibles into insurance contracts.14 Thus, farmers 
do not bear any significant part of yield losses themselves. Moreover, state-owned insurers 
often assess the loss as the difference between actual and normal yields, whereby the latter 
tends to be set too high (Hazell 1992). Recent research by Turvey, Hoy and Islam (2002) 
showed that, theoretically at least, moral hazard costs can be controlled by ex ante regulations, 
e.g. by obliging farmers to use certain standards in farming practice. Nevertheless, such ex 
ante regulations require a strong monitoring system, which in itself will create costs. 
                                                 
11 With traditional insurance (idiosyncratic risks), pooling independent loss events creates a mean loss for the 
pool that has a variance that is less than the mean of the individual variances. This result is derived from the 
classic statistical property of the law of large numbers – the variance of the one aggregate number is lower than 
the variance of many numbers that sum together to make the one number. The law of large numbers implies that, 
as one increases the number of insured persons possessing independent and identically valued risks, one 
increases the accuracy of prediction of the risk generated by each individual (Priest 2003). 
12 Literature on livestock insurance, particularly in developing countries, is relatively scarce. However, 
experiences from crop insurance schemes can often be applied directly to livestock insurance schemes. 
13 In recent years, numerous studies have examined the causes of market failure of crop insurance programs and 
have concluded that failure stems entirely from asymmetric information problems (adverse selection and moral 
hazard.) However, these studies have not answered the question of whether the observed adverse selection and 
moral hazard are intrinsic to crop insurance, or whether they are consequences of program design. If covariate 
risk and not asymmetric information is the primary cause of market failure, then cost-efficient remedies for 
market failure may be available in the form of area/index based insurance or exchange-traded area yield options 
(Miranda and Glauber 1997). 
14 Deductibles are methods used by insurers to share risk with policy holders and reduce their tendency towards 
moral hazard behavior, whereby an amount is established that a policy holder agrees to pay, per claim or per 
accident, toward the total amount of an insured loss (Brown and Churchill 1999). 
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A situation with asymmetric information (leading to adverse selection and moral hazard) 
creates serious problems for any multiple-peril crop insurance (Skees 1999).15 Adverse 
selection and moral hazard will ultimately result in prohibitively high insurance premia. The 
lesson to be drawn is clear: one must invest a great deal in monitoring before having a crop 
insurance program that will be actuarially sound (Skees, Hazell and Miranda 1999). Finally, 
due to the covariate character of the risk, there is the need to use international reinsurers to 
cover the risk, which again raises the premium (Skees et al. 2002). Thus, in government-
supported insurance schemes, premia often became so high that farmers were unwilling to 
insure coverage. Here, many governments stepped in with huge subsidies, as it was, and still 
is, believed that multiple-risk crop insurance helps the rural population. Several governments 
tried to use multiple-risk crop insurance to transfer income to poor farmers and provide them 
with relief in times of need. However, both welfare objectives are called into question by the 
observation that crop insurance mostly benefits the larger-scale and more prosperous farmers, 
particularly when it is tied to agricultural credit (Hazell, Pomareda and Valdes 1986).16 
Furthermore, potential societal welfare gains from multiple-peril crop insurances are quickly 
swamped by the high transaction costs of monitoring the micro-level problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard or, if extra sources are used by rent seekers, to obtain high 
subsidies (Skees 1999). The costs of multiple-risk crop insurance tend to be particularly high 
in developing countries. Large numbers of small farms and a wide diversity of agricultural 
practices greatly add to administration and inspection costs. Poor data on actuarial risks and a 
lack of skilled personal also hamper the writing and enforcing of sound contracts (Hazell, 
Pomareda and Valdes 1986). 
Area-based insurance:17 Considering the lessons learnt from the failure of past multiple-peril 
insurance programs, Hazell (2001) states that an insurance system is needed that meets the 
following requirements:  
1. It avoids the moral hazard and adverse selection problems that have bedeviled most 
agricultural insurance programs. 
2. It compensates for catastrophic income losses to protect consumption and debt 
repayment capacity. 
3. It is affordable and accessible to all kinds of rural people, including the poor. 
4. It is practical to implement given the limited kinds of data available in most 
developing countries. 
5. It can be provided by the private sector with little or no government subsidies. 
Area-based insurance schemes can meet all these requirements. These pay a pre-defined 
indemnity by occurrence of the event, e.g. a drought, irrespective of whether the insurant has 
suffered loss and irrespective of the amount of loss. On the one hand, there might be a 
problem in the fact that an individual can have a loss and not be paid because the major event 
trigging a payment has not occurred, e.g. a local rain hole in case of rain-index insurance. On 
                                                 
15 Adverse selection means that one party to a contract is unable to measure accurately certain valued human 
qualities or attributes of non-human resources that he or she seeks to acquire (Eggertsson 1990). This inability to 
measure important qualities to a contract, combined with wrong signals from a potential policy holder, may lead 
an insurer to accept a person as client with a higher-than-average chance of loss at standard (average) rates. This, 
if not controlled by underwriting, results in higher-than-expected loss levels (Brown and Churchill 1999). For 
instance, adverse selection arises when the potential policyholders are better informed about the distribution of 
their own losses than the possible insurer. Individuals who recognize that their expected indemnities exceed their 
premia are more likely to purchase coverage than those who recognize the opposite (Miranda and Glauber 1997). 
Therefore, it is important to pool large numbers of roughly homogenous, independent exposure units to give an 
accurate prediction of average future losses and to control adverse selection (Priest 2003; Skees 1999).  
16 Landless and other rural people are completely excluded from this scheme, even if they are also affected by 
the natural disaster. 
17 Area yield and area index insurance function according to the same principles. In the following sections, 
therefore, no distinction is made between these two types and both are referred to as area-based insurances. 
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the other hand, it is also possible for an individual to receive payment when he suffers no loss, 
and this special aspect makes index contracts very attractive. However, these two aspects 
require special education and awareness-raising among potential users concerning how the 
contracts work and how to reduce agricultural income risk (Hazell 2001; Skees 1999).18 
Relevant information for area-based insurance, e.g. area yield, rainfall data, etc., is generally 
and publicly available and more reliable than information collected form the individual farm 
(usually yields).19 Thus, insurers can more accurately assess the actuarial fairness of premia 
under an area-based policy and thereby significantly reduce adverse selection problems. 
Moreover, because the indemnities are based on area or aggregated data rather than on the 
individual producer’s yield, a producer cannot significantly increase his indemnity by altering 
his production practices. The insured farmer still has the same economic incentives as the 
non-insured farmer. Thus, under an area-based insurance program, moral hazard is essentially 
eliminated, too. Administrative costs are substantially reduced, because claims do not need to 
be adjusted individually, and costly on-farm inspections and verification of individual 
production histories are no longer required (Skees 1999; Miranda 1991). 
Area-based insurance provides effective risk management only in areas where risks are 
largely covariate. Individual risks cannot be covered through area-based insurance. Having a 
high covariate risk does improve the efficacy of an area-based contract, but the presence of 
high covariate risk is potentially troublesome for all insurance schemes. When a payment is 
due, then all those who have purchased area-based insurance must be paid at the same time. 
Moreover, if the insured risks in different regions are highly correlated, then the insurer faces 
the possibility of having to make huge payments in some years. To hedge against this risk, the 
insurer can either diversify regionally by selecting indices and sites that are not highly 
correlated, or sell part of the risk to the international financial markets through reinsurance 
(Skees, Black and Barnett 1997; Skees, Hazell and Miranda 1999). Prospects for diversifying 
risks across regions are feasible within some large countries, but are unlikely to be sufficient 
for most developing countries. International reinsurance is already available for some kinds of 
natural disaster risks. But despite significant growth in the international reinsurance markets 
in recent years, reinsurance markets are still thin, with few large international firms and 
limited capacity (Hazell 2001). Covariate risk undermines the insurer’s ability to pool risks 
across individuals. Reinsurers, like all insurers, are essentially designed to address 
diversifiable, not covariate, risks. Despite their greater size and diversity, major reinsurers 
ultimately face the same structural limitations faced by smaller insurers: the cost of holding 
sufficient reserves to cover the huge losses that would accompany a widespread drought, for 
example, would render crop insurance prohibitively expensive. Options and futures markets 
offer a viable alternative to government reinsurance precisely because such markets are 
designed for the allocation of highly correlated risk (Gardner 1977; Miranda and Glauber 
1997).  
As area-based insurance is not bound to data from individual farms, not only small-scale 
farmers affected by a covariate risk in agriculture would be able to purchase area-based 
insurance contracts, but also agricultural traders. Area-based insurance could also be sold in 
small units that might appeal particularly to poor people (Hazell 2001). 
                                                 
18 Area-based contracts are not true insurance contracts, however, since payments to producers are not based on 
their own specific losses. Instead, area-based insurance may be more accurately described as a hedging 
instrument (Miranda 1991). 
19 Indexes are calculated on the basis of independent, measurable variables that are difficult to manipulate, e.g. 
rainfall, temperature, and soil moisture. Area-yield insurance schemes are calculated on the basis of e.g. district 
yields or animal mortality rates. If the area in question is big enough, then the aggregated yields cannot be 
influenced by a single farmer or a small group of farmers. 
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A number of studies have recognized that markets may more easily provide area-based 
insurance than traditional insurance schemes, e.g. multiple-risk crop yield schemes (Skees 
1999; Skees et al. 2002; Skees, Hazell and Miranda 1999). But more importantly, once an 
area-based index removes much of the covariate risk, an insurer can wrap individual coverage 
around such a policy to handle independent risk (i.e., certain situations where the loss of an 
individual is not covered by the area-based insurance) (Hazell 2001). 
3.4 Delivery of insurance in combination with credit 
As mentioned before, agriculture is a risky business and farmers face a variety of risks related 
to weather, pests, disease, and markets. Given an uncertain income each year, farmers must 
worry about their ability to repay loans, or even meet the essential living costs of their 
families. These risks are also of concern to agricultural lending institutions. Confronted with 
risky borrowers, lenders must seek to reduce the possibility of poor loan recovery rates in 
unfavorable years, even if this means only modest levels of lending to agriculture (Hazell 
1992; Skees, Hazell and Miranda 1999). Therefore, agricultural insurance has proved 
attractive to agricultural lending institutions, particularly when insurance is tied to farm credit 
on a compulsory basis. In the event of an insured disaster, the indemnity is paid directly to the 
lending institution to cancel the farmer’s debt. From the institution’s point of view, this is an 
effective way to reduce loan defaults and thus protect its capital assets. The farmer, however, 
often perceives compulsory insurance as another cost component attached to the loan, thus 
increasing the transaction costs on his borrowing and lowering demand for credit (Hazell 
1992; Hazell, Pomareda and Valdes 1986). Often such compulsory schemes for borrowers are 
not accepted by households on a voluntary basis. After repayment of the loan, people usually 
drop the insurance and non-borrowing households do not join, as shown by evidence from 
Nepal, for example (CMF 2000a). Nevertheless, Mishra (1994) showed in an empirical study 
in India that a compulsory crop insurance/credit scheme has improved access to credit for 
peasants. The insurance has served as a (partial) substitute for collateral.  
Protecting poor clients from risk, reducing lender’s loan defaults, and earning additional 
income related to the loan portfolio are all objectives that have been cited for the recent flood 
of initiatives by MFIs to develop insurance products for the low-income market. However, the 
vast majority of MFIs lack the experience required to price the products; they do not have the 
resources (human and financial) to support an insurance product and are too small to achieve 
a sufficient level of risk pooling. The danger with MFIs offering insurance services is that 
losses in insurance operations can deplete depositors’ assets and the MFI’s loan capital in a 
single catastrophic event. Therefore, only sound and financially sustainable MFIs should offer 
microinsurance services. Nevertheless, few MFIs have reached financial sustainability 
(Brown 2000a). Moreover, there is also the potential danger of moral hazard with bank staff, 
which can lead to a serious loss of discipline in banking practice. Why, for example, should 
an MFI staff member try to collect loans from a tardy borrower if they can more easily obtain 
repayment from the insurer (Hazell 1992)?  
Technical management of insurance services is different from credit and saving programs. It 
is therefore quite pertinent that microfinance providers should arrange insurance cover 
through a separate institution (Ali 2000). Partnering is a technique used by developed insurers 
when they are considering expanding into a new line of business. Partnering is also the best 
way for MFIs to gather all the necessary knowledge that is needed for the insurance business. 
For instance, managers need to be able to predict, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, what 
the size of the future claims will be. If predictions prove to be inaccurate, unexpectedly high 
insurance claims can decapitalize an institution. It is important to note that the level of 
complexity and the resources and skills required for each activity are much greater for health 
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and property insurance than for life insurance, as fraud and moral hazard are less prevalent in 
life insurance (Brown 2000a). 
Transaction costs in the insurance market are undeniably high, and experience indicates that it 
is difficult to offer effective and sustainable insurance products to the rural population, and 
particularly poor people (Del Conte 2001). Existing MFIs can assist greatly in reducing 
transaction costs for setting up an insurance scheme as they already possess experience of 
serving low-income clients. For instance, the same borrowing groups established for 
microfinance (credit and savings) could be used as a conduit for selling insurance, either to 
the group as a whole, or to individuals who might wish to insure their loans (Hazell 2001). 
4 The animal health system in Vietnam 
While Section 3 provided the economic background information for the discussion of 
livestock insurance schemes, this section describes the animal health system of Vietnam. 
Premia need to be calculated based on a loss history (the frequency and the number of losses 
over time). In the field of animal production, the required information is provided by the 
animal health system of a given country and in particular by the country’s disease surveillance 
system. In addition to the risk of diseases/epidemics, the amount of damage from a disease, as 
well as the behavior of animal keepers and veterinarians to prevent, treat and eradicate 
diseases, is not only influenced by the animal health system but also by the agricultural 
extension system of a country. In the following chapter, therefore, Vietnam’s animal health 
and agricultural extension systems are introduced. 
4.1 Organization and functionality of veterinary services in Vietnam 
The Department of Animal Health (DAH) is responsible for the overall control of animal 
diseases and stipulates how disease control should be carried out at the different 
administrative levels. DAH is one department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (MARD). The following institutions are under direct management of DAH (Lan 
2000; Lan and Phuong 1999): 
• three National Centers (disease diagnosis; quality control of drugs/vaccines; veterinary 
sanitary inspection), 
• six Regional Centers (implementation of animal health measures, e.g. import/export 
regulations and sanitary inspection), each center covering eight to twelve provinces, 
• six International Quarantine Stations (movement of animals for import/export, 
required animal health certificates issued by DAH).  
The Provincial Veterinary Sub-Departments working under the Provincial Departments for 
Agriculture (DARD) form the basis of the state veterinary services. They receive technical 
advice, but very little financial support from DAH. The Provincial Sub-Departments direct 
their work mostly via the District Veterinary Stations (Lan 2000). They also manage the 
inland sanitary inspection stations along the main routes, controlling the movement of animals 
between provinces and issue the required animal health certificates (Lan and Phuong 1999).  
Each District Veterinary Station is responsible for several communes, where it is in charge of 
surveillance, monitoring of disease outbreaks and organization of vaccination campaigns. It 
often provides further (income-earning) services including supplementary vaccination, selling 
drugs or artificial insemination in its respective catchment area (Lan 2000). Staff members at 
provincial and district levels are public servants, paid by the provincial government. At grass-
root levels, veterinary ‘fieldwork’ is done by Commune and Village Animal Health workers 
(AHW), also called para-vets. These are private entrepreneurs earning their income from 
farmers’ fees (Landon-Lane and Thao 2001). However, the activities of AHW are only 
loosely controlled, their training is very limited, and their total income is low. As a result, 
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animal diseases are often not detected, not reported in time, or reported inadequately and 
inaccurately (ASPS and ACI 2002; Lan 2000). In addition, producers are reluctant to report 
outbreaks, since they are unable or unwilling to pay for treatment and are afraid to have their 
animals culled. Often, producers react to animal diseases by selling or slaughtering the 
affected animals (ASPS and ACI 2002). The availability of a livestock insurance, and thus 
compensation for animal losses, would eventually improve farmers’ motivation to report 
animal diseases and losses.  
The diagnosis of animal diseases by village and commune animal health workers is based on 
the clinical symptoms of diseased animals (Lan 2000). Further diagnosis can be done at 
higher levels with improved laboratory facilities (Lan and Phuong 1999). Routine reporting is 
carried out on a monthly, quarterly and annual basis to DAH/Epidemiological Division; in 
addition, there are notification and monitoring reports on disease outbreaks. The surveillance 
system can build upon data from laboratory submissions, veterinary services at field level, 
national and international checkpoints/quarantine stations, and from population data from 
mass vaccination campaigns and livestock censuses (Lan and Phuong 1999). The animal 
health information system is organized from the field to the central level, ending at the 
Epidemiological Division of DAH (Lan 2000). In general, it is hampered by limited finances, 
technical skills and limitations in terms of computer equipment. Computers are often only 
available in offices at the national level. Data analysis and processing are still conducted 
manually; where available, computers are used for recording and storing data. Laboratory 
reports, field disease reports, livestock movement reports etc., are paper records (Lan and 
Phuong 1999).  
Disease prevention measures: Vaccination campaigns are conducted twice per year in spring 
and autumn (Lan, 2000), with additional private vaccination initiatives by farmers. Each year, 
DAH promulgates a vaccination plan depending on the current animal disease situation, 
scheduling additional vaccinations if required. The Provincial Sub-Departments are 
responsible for the management and distribution of vaccine under the terms of that 
vaccination plan (Lan 2000; Lan and Phuong 1999). 
Since liberalization, subsidies for vaccination have decreased considerably and are now 
mainly paid in areas with special conditions.20 As a result, vaccination coverage has decreased 
from 70-80% in the 1980s to 40-50% in the 1990s (Thuy 1999). While official vaccination 
campaigns are compulsory, their efficiency is limited for example by a lack of, or inadequate, 
facilities for cold storage of the vaccine, or by failure to conduct vaccination in accordance 
with medical standards (Lan 2000; Thuy 2001). Due to ignorance or as a result of negative 
experiences, many producers consider vaccinations to be unnecessary, too expensive, not 
helpful, or even dangerous (Lemke et al. 2000; Thuy 2001).  
Measures in the event of a disease outbreak: As mentioned above, the diagnosis of animal 
diseases by AHW is based on clinical disease symptoms (Lan 2000). Standard post-mortem 
inspection or sample-taking are rarely conducted. If a notifiable disease is reported, a 
preliminary diagnosis is made and preliminary control measures are ordered by the District 
Veterinary Station. The Provincial Veterinary Sub-Department is responsible for confirming 
the preliminary diagnosis and adapting the control measures. The Provincial Sub-Department 
will send samples to the above-mentioned regional or national laboratories if it is unable to 
make a definite diagnosis (Lan 2000). Due to a general lack of diagnostic facilities, reagents 
and tests, however, confirmatory diagnosis is often not carried out (Forman and Leslie 1997; 
Lan 2000). Weekly monitoring is carried out until the outbreak is controlled (Lan and Phuong 
1999). Generally speaking, in many cases diseases are undiagnosed or wrongly diagnosed, 
                                                 
20 For instance, areas facing an outbreak/under risk of an outbreak, poor communes (Forman and Leslie 1997; 
Thuy 1999). 
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leading to insufficient or inappropriate treatment and creating a misleading picture of the 
epidemiological situation, and this may hamper or delay the appropriate treatment of bigger 
disease outbreaks.  
Reasons for failure to detect diseases not only include incompetence on the part of AHW and 
the reluctance of producers to report outbreaks, but also the lax or absent implementation of 
policies and, in some areas, the lack of legislation, which hampers detection in the first place 
(ASPS and ACI 2002). As an example, control measures for foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), 
including vaccination, control of the movement of animals and slaughter inspection are not 
simultaneously coordinated and strictly implemented throughout Vietnam (Thuy 2001). FMD 
and other infectious diseases are often imported with illegal animal transports from 
neighboring countries without adequate control of movements of animals; reporting of 
diseased animals and application of quarantine measures are not conducted. Moreover, the 
marketing system, which is based on middlemen, results in considerable animal movements 
without appropriate controls, supporting transmission of FMD within the country (Forman 
1996). For both reasons, most animal imports/movements in the country bypass checkpoints 
and are thus not detected (Forman and Leslie 1997). 
At present, the government has no institutionalized system to compensate farmers for animal 
losses (Lan 2000). There is, however, occasional and irregular compensation for farmers in 
some outbreak regions. As an example, the provinces compensated farmers for birds culled in 
the highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreak (autumn 2003 to spring 2004). This 
compensation was equivalent to only a part of the birds’ market value. Farmers were thus 
reluctant to have their birds culled and preferred to sell them (when that was still possible at 
the beginning of the outbreak), possibly leading to further distribution of the disease (AFP 
2004).  
Reliability of data on animal diseases: Animal disease prevalence data for Vietnam have to 
be looked at cautiously: systematic surveys on diseases are lacking, the surveillance system is 
not working properly and official (information) policy is restrictive (Werthmüller 2000).  
The number of new incidences in the population per time unit (in short: disease incidence) is 
the most important epidemiological information for estimating disease costs or disease control 
costs (Stein and Leman 1982). However, incidence is only seldom assessed, since this 
requires panel data on a large scale (Harrison and Cameron 1999). Disease prevalence 
(number of diseased animals at a certain time as a percentage of the total animal population) 
is only a substitute for incidence information, especially for diseases with high mortality. This 
means that the most accurate and important epidemiological information for setting up 
insurance schemes is not available anyway, and that the (partly available and not always 
reliable) prevalence data are a substitute for any potential insurance company to deal with.  
When thinking about a livestock insurance scheme, one would first consider the ‘great 
epidemics’. In collaboration with FAO and WHO, the OIE (Office International des 
Epizooties) has established a three-tier disease classification system, including list A diseases, 
list B and other diseases. Both list A and list B diseases are transmissible diseases of socio-
economic and public health importance and are significant in international trade. In contrast to 
list B diseases, list A diseases are capable of rapid spread irrespective of national boarders 
(Cameron, Baldock and Chamnanpood 1999). Table 1 and Table 2 document the occurrence 
of list A and list B diseases for Vietnam between 2000 and 2002.  
Both, FMD and CSF are endemic in Vietnam, and outbreaks are observed more or less 
annually (Table 1). FMD causes a relatively low case fatality rate in ruminants (between 0.3 
and 2.2%) but a considerable case fatality rate in pigs (between 10.5 and 17.7% are reported). 
However, even if fatality is low, the performance of diseased animals may be decreased 
temporarily or permanently, leading to production losses on the farm. As an example, in the 
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case of FMD, adult ruminants may suffer from a severe reduction of milk yield and draught 
performance (Thuy 2001). CSF in pigs comes with a very high case fatality rate of between 
62.5 and 97.1% in the years 2000 to 2002.  
 
Table 1 Reported outbreaks of list A diseases in Vietnam between 2000 and 2002, 
large ruminants and pigs 
 2000 2001 2002 
 Out-
breaks 
Cases Fatality*
in % 
Out-
breaks 
Cases Fatality*
in % 
Out-
breaks 
Cases Fatality*
in % 
FMD**, ruminants n.a. 7,607 1.6 n.a. 648 2.2 20 1,529 0.3 
FMD**, pigs n.a. 2,009 10.5 0 / / 1 136 17.7 
CSF*** n.a. 18,106 97.1 n.a. 17,805 87.0 n.a. 19,891 62.5 
Source: http://www.oie.int (data accessed 6/2/2004) 
Note: n.a. = data not available 
 *Fatality = number of deaths from a specified cause in a specified time period /total number cases of 
 the same disease (Dohoo, Martin and Stryhn 2003)  
 **FMD = Foot-and-Mouth Disease, ***CSF = Classical Swine Fever 
 
Table 2  Reported outbreaks of list B diseases in Vietnam between 2000 and 2002, 
large ruminants and pigs 
 2000 2001 2002 
 Out-
breaks
Cases Fatality*
in % 
Out-
breaks 
Cases Fatality*
in % 
Out-
breaks 
Cases Fatality*
in % 
Ruminants          
Anthrax 2 4 100.0 1 3 100.0 3 5 20.0 
Rabies 0 / / 7 17 100.0 0 / / 
Anaplasmosis n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
HS** n.a. 5,5940 n.a. n.a. 11,555 23.2 n.a. 9,860 5.4 
Theileriosis 0 / / n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Trypanosomosis 0 / / n.a. 4,778 5.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Pigs          
Rabies 0 / / 0 / / 0 / / 
Leptospirosis n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,030 4.7 n.a. 1,247 2.8 
PRRS*** 0 / / n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source: http://www.oie.int (data accessed 6/2/2004) 
Note: n.a. = data not available 
 *Fatality = number of deaths from a specified cause in a specified time period /total number cases 
 of the same disease (Dohoo, Martin and Stryhn 2003) 
 **HS = haemorrhagic septicaemia,  
 ***PRRS = Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome 
 
Among the list B diseases, some come with a high case fatality rate, but in fact seldom occur 
in farm animals (e.g. anthrax, rabies). Other diseases combine a low outbreak frequency with 
a low case fatality rate (e.g. trypanosomosis). An exception is HS, which occurs quite 
regularly with varying fatality, sometimes reaching considerable rates (e.g. 23% case fatality 
in 2001) (Table 2). 
Beside list A/B diseases, other diseases occur and may cause production losses or death in 
animals. It is not possible to give a complete picture of disease prevalence and disease-
specific mortality in Vietnam here. Instead, Table 3 shows figures for overall livestock 
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mortality in Vietnam.21 Mortality varies across species and years. For ruminants, mortality 
rates of between zero and 25% (cattle) to 27% (buffaloes) have been reported. For pigs, the 
reported rate of overall mortality is higher, at 5-37%. Anecdotal reports give much higher 
mortality rates for all kinds of livestock. 
Regarding the data shown on animal disease occurrence and fatality in Table 1 and Table 2, it 
must be said that the OIE reporting system depends on submissions from national veterinary 
authorities; in Vietnam the relevant authority is the Department of Animal Health. The 
absence of a report does not necessarily indicate the absence of disease, but may be due to 
weaknesses in the national disease surveillance system or inadequate diagnostic laboratory 
systems, resulting in failure to diagnose the disease (Cameron, Baldock and Chamnanpood 
1999).  
 
Table 3 Mortality in large ruminants and pigs in North Vietnam 
Species Mortality 
reported 
 Details on data collection* Source 
Cattle  25%  Vaccination trial (against Pasteurellosis),  
n = 12, period approx. 3 month, Nghe An province 
(Gibson 1998) 
 7%  Vaccination trial (control group),  
n = 194, period approx. 3 month, Nghe An province 
(Gibson 1998) 
 0%  Baseline survey,  
n = 40, period 12 months, Lang Son province 
(SVSV 2000) 
Buffaloes 27%  Baseline survey, 
n = 30, period approx. 3 month, Nghe An province 
(Gibson 1998) 
 4%  Baseline survey,  
n = 47, period 12 months, Lang Son province 
(SVSV 2000) 
Large 
ruminants 
7%  Baseline survey, 
n = 138, period 5 years, Son La province 
(Lemke et al. 2005) 
Pigs 34%  Vaccination trial (against CSF + Pasteurellosis),  
n = 32, period approx. 1.5 month, Nghe An province 
(Gibson 1998) 
 26%  Vaccination trial (control group),  
n = 256, period approx. 1.5 month, Nghe An province  
(Gibson 1998) 
 5%  Baseline survey,  
n = 60, period 12 months, Lang Son province 
(SVSV 2000) 
 19%  Baseline survey, 
n = 1227, period 12 month, Son La province 
(Lemke et al. 2005)  
 21%  Baseline survey,  
n = 1196, period 12 month, Son La province 
(Lemke et al. 2005)  
Note: * n refers to number of observed animals; period refers to observation period 
 
Besides the weaknesses in the animal disease surveillance systems discussed above, leading to 
poor reliability of epidemiological data, it is assumed that in fact more data on animal 
diseases have been recorded with a greater accuracy than is known to the public. Again, an 
example is the outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (AI) in 2003/04: development 
aid projects working in the area reported outbreaks earlier and in greater number than was 
reported in the Vietnamese state media and confirmed by local authorities. When Vietnam 
declared itself finally free of AI by the end of March 2004, FAO and WHO repeatedly voiced 
concerns regarding Vietnam’s information policy on and openness regarding the outbreak 
(www.promedmail.org, a program of the International Society for Infectious Diseases, 
postings e.g. on 30/3/2004). 
                                                 
21 Mortality = number of deaths from a specified cause in a specified time period/total population at risk (Dohoo, 
Martin, and Stryhn 2003). 
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One reason for underreporting of animal diseases may lie in the strong export orientation of 
Vietnam. Meat exports from Vietnam are still insignificant and hampered, among other 
things, by having a veterinary sanitary status that is unacceptable for most importers 
(Barwinek 2002). Countries free from major diseases tend to ban livestock imports from areas 
affected by animal diseases, with a focus on the OIE list A diseases. The desire to gain access 
to export markets is the driving force behind many animal disease eradication efforts, but 
possibly also behind the attempt to veil the actual epidemiological situation. Meeting the 
requirements for a country to enter export markets is costly (implementation of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary measures (SPS).22 National export-oriented disease control, meanwhile, might 
not necessarily benefit the poor (Otte, Nugent and McLeod 2004). Whether or not this 
consideration influences the Vietnamese way of handling epidemiological information 
remains hypothetical, however. Vietnam hopes to become a full WTO member by 2005 
(Barwinek 2002).  
4.2 Extension service 
Before 1986, innovations and improvements in agriculture were disseminated via the 
Vietnamese cooperative and state farm system. As a result of Doi Moi, most cooperative/state 
farms were closed at the end of the 1980s or reorganized into self-managed cooperatives 
independent of the state (Landon-Lane and Thao 2001; Sabio and Ibus 1994). In 1993, Decree 
13 ’For establishment of a national agricultural extension network from central to local levels 
and encouragement of volunteer institutions for agricultural extension’ established the legal 
basis for closure of the gap in the extension system. While today agricultural support services 
are in a state of transition for both public and private suppliers, public suppliers still dominate 
the field (Landon-Lane and Thao 2001).  
The agricultural extension system is managed by the Department of Agriculture and Forestry 
Extension (under MARD) at the national level, and by the Agricultural Extension Centers 
(under the Departments of Agriculture and Rural Development DARD) at the provincial level. 
Subordinate structures include agricultural extension stations at district level, basic 
agricultural extension units at commune level and smaller structures like extension clubs at 
village level (Nham and Giang 2002). However, at district level and below, both the degree 
and the manner of implementation of extension structures vary widely between the provinces 
(Sabio and Ibus 1994; Siem, Nam and Hung 1997). It has been estimated that only 5-10% of 
all Vietnamese farmers have access to extension services (Eklöf 1995; SVSV 1998). Since 
then, the public extension system has gradually expanded. However in 2001, 20% of all 
districts were still without extension structures. Agricultural extension is predominately crop-
oriented (Landon-Lane and Thao 2001). In 1999, 22.6% of the state budget for extension was 
spent on husbandry; the biggest share of the budget went into cropping (42.4%), the 
remaining budget spent on forestry, aquaculture, VAC system promotion,23 development of 
the extension system, and information and training (MARD 1999). Anecdotally, extension 
services have been called “breed-distribution services” focusing on the provision of crop 
cultivars or – mostly exotic – animal breeds (MARD 1999; Siem, Nam and Hung 1997). 
                                                 
22 The Uruguay Round under the auspices of the WTO started an era of agricultural trade liberalization affecting 
both developed and developing countries. The SPS Agreement in 1995 aims to provide a framework for 
protecting human, animal, and plant health and life, while preventing unjustifiable barriers to trade. Countries are 
allowed to establish their preferred level of SPS protection, but the WTO convenes a panel to assess whether the 
measure conforms to the provisions of the Agreement. Developing countries sometimes believe that the reason 
they are unable to gain access to developed country markets is more due to restrictions arising out of consumer 
preferences/concerns than to justified SPS controls, which is difficult to disprove since the risk assessment 
process inside the SPS Agreement is not fully established (Otte, Nugent and McLeod 2004). 
23 VAC = vuon (Vn.)/garden, ao (Vn.)/fish pond, chuong (Vn.)/stable); abbreviation for one type of integrated 
production system. 
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Regarding the households covered by this research, as much as 50% of the total sample 
receives extension services related to animal husbandry.24 Due to the great variation in 
extension services between the different districts and the sampling procedure of the two 
surveys, however, it is not certain that this figure is representative for all northern areas or 
even the whole country. 
Extension services are intended to self-finance from users’ fees with some additional budgets 
from the province and state. However, the budget allocated to the extension services is far 
from sufficient, and most farmers cannot afford to pay for extension service. Thus, extension 
services are chronically under-funded (SVSV 1998; Landon-Lane and Thao 2001). Extension 
services from private companies come with the risk that extension focuses on financially 
strong farmers.  
The extension service is organized in top-down manner (Nham and Giang 2002). At the 
provincial level, DARD, together with district authorities and district extension staff, will 
select communes for implementation of extension measures, and commune authorities will 
then recommend farmers for participation in extension courses (Nho and Tung 2001). 
Extension topics are mainly communicated through lectures, and interactive teaching is not 
conducted. Extension material is severely limited in both quantity and quality. Extension 
often focuses on people who have good relations with the authorities, and farmers without 
such relations, indigenous people or poor farmers tend to be excluded. Mass media play an 
important role in disseminating extension topics. Private suppliers, state farms, drug or feed 
shops and mass organizations supply limited extension services in addition to the above 
(Landon-Lane and Thao 2001).  
With a focus on the mountainous provinces, there is a serious shortage of extension staff and 
especially of extension officers experienced in working with ethnic minority communities, 
and possessing knowledge of their farming systems, society and culture, or even able to speak 
their languages. Furthermore, the mountain provinces suffer more than other provinces from 
an inadequate extension budget allocation (Siem, Nam and Hung 1997). National 
development approaches for the mountainous regions implemented so far have mostly 
attempted to apply lowland models and followed top-down planning approaches, ignoring 
local conditions and local knowledge, be it concerning agriculture, agricultural extension or 
other fields (Rambo 1997; van de Walle and Gunewardena 2001; World Bank and DFID 
1999). 
5 Livestock insurance schemes in Vietnam 
This research aimed at assessing the demand for livestock insurance among farmers in two 
provinces in North Vietnam (Bac Kan, Son La), as well as factors influencing that demand. 
Due to data availability and the quality of the surveys conducted, only large ruminants (cattle, 
buffalos) and pigs were considered in the analysis. 
5.1 Demand 
Demand for livestock insurance was found to be affected by different socio-economic factors. 
The following section discusses the most important differences between households that 
demand and do not demand livestock insurance.   
Overall, 77% of all households in the sample (n = 322) demand livestock insurance. 76% of 
the households in the sample keep large ruminants (buffaloes or cattle). Over 57% of all 
households demand livestock insurance for large ruminants and 75% of households keeping 
                                                 
24 Since 2002, subproject D2 has offered animal husbandry extension services on selected issues concerning pig 
raising for farmers participating in the project. The figure mentioned above relates only to the state-owned 
extension service. 
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large ruminants demand livestock insurance for them. If we consider households that keep 
only large ruminants and no pigs, this figure increases to 80%. 73% of all households in the 
sample keep pigs and 54% households with pigs demand livestock insurance for pigs. For 
households that keep only pigs and no large ruminants, the share of households demanding 
livestock insurance increases to 59%. However, as there is a bias in the sample towards pig-
keeping households, these numbers may be overestimated if we consider the total population 
of Northern Vietnam.  
5.1.1 Livestock insurance for large ruminants  
Households that demand livestock insurance for large ruminants earn significantly less cash 
income than households where there is no demand, indicating that the latter may be more 
capable of self-financing losses than the first. Moreover, insurance demanders dwell in 
remoter areas (see Table 4). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that households that demand 
livestock insurance for large ruminants are poorer than those who do not. The risk-averse 
behavior of the rural poor is well known.  
Households demanding insurance for ruminants have bigger paddy plots than households 
where there is no demand, hinting at the importance of large ruminants for draught power on 
paddy fields. One surprising result is that households demanding insurance for large 
ruminants tend to have fewer animal losses. This would be a good start-up position for an 
insurance company offering an insurance policy. One explanation for this may be that 
households that do not demand insurance have set their production focus differently, e.g. off-
farm or pig production, and thus care less about their cattle or buffaloes. Rural households in 
Vietnam are supposed to receive compensation for loss of large ruminants in certain cases, 
e.g. foot-and-mouth disease. However, it is reported that such compensation is paid out 
arbitrarily, leaving many farmers without any compensation. Farmers who did not receive 
compensation are very likely to reject a livestock insurance scheme, as they are likely to 
assume that they will not receive any indemnity in the event of an animal’s death.25  
 
Table 4 Characteristics of households keeping large ruminants and demanding 
livestock insurance (t-test of means) 
Variable Demanding 
insurance 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
T-Test 
No (N=58) 12.7 mn 18.9 mn Cash revenue/HH/year 
total in VND Yes (N=177) 7.4 mn 7.5 mn 2.091** 
No (N=58) 8.4 km 6.1 km Distance to district capital 
in km Yes (N=177) 11.2 km 7.4 km -2.946*** 
No (N=58) 1,462 m2 1,814 m2 Area of paddy rice 
Yes  (N=176) 2,047 m2 1,817 m2 -2.127** 
No (N=58) 378,621 804,495 Loss of buffaloes, 
cattle/HH/year in VND Yes  (N=177) 90,415 438,679 2.604** 
Note: N is different due to missing values and sub-samples. HH = household 
 * Significant at 10% level, ** significant 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. 
The following variables were tested but did not show significant results: wealth group, cash income 
from animal production, percentage of livestock production from total cash revenue, numbers of 
market visits per month, years of schooling of household head and wife, total farm size with and 
without forest land, animal loss per animal kept, number of animals, veterinary costs, veterinary costs 
per animal, fodder costs, fodder cost per animal, total costs and total costs per animal. 
 
                                                 
25 Anecdotal evidence shows that farmers believe that an insurance scheme would be certain to have government 
involvement. Despite the negative experience of some farmers with compensation payments in general, private 
companies have a very bad image in Vietnam and many farmers stated that they would only take out insurance if 
the government were involved in the scheme. 
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Households that receive an extension service for animal husbandry exhibit more frequent 
demand for insurance for large ruminants. This could indicate that extension increases 
awareness of certain animal diseases (Table 5). 
 
Table 5 Extension services for households demanding livestock insurance for 
large ruminants (Chi-square test) 
Demanding insurance   
No Yes 
Chi-square Sig. 
No 37 37 Extension service for animal 
husbandry Yes 20 109 12.884 0.000 
Note: * Because of missing values, N can vary slightly. 
The following variables were tested but did not show significant results: affiliation to ethnic minority 
and sex. 
 
5.1.2 Livestock insurance for pigs 
Households demanding livestock insurance produce pigs on a more intensive scale, as their 
production costs in total and per pig are significantly higher (Table 6). Interestingly, high 
fodder expenses are positively correlated to demand for insurance for pigs, but veterinary 
expenses are not. This may be explained by the statement made by many farmers: “I do not 
need insurance because I vaccinate my animals”. As farmers who vaccinate their pigs are 
apparently more reluctant to insure their animals than the others, the insurers face a dilemma: 
those that vaccinate are a better insurance risk for them, but they may not readily participate 
in an insurance scheme, while those who do not vaccinate are a worse insurance risk but more 
likely to participate. The insurers must consider this behavior when pricing their premia. 
Otherwise, the insurers must be careful not to end up with bad insurance risks based on a 
selection policy that gives rise to adverse selection criteria.  
 
Table 6 Characteristics of households keeping pigs and demanding livestock 
insurance (t-test of means) 
Variable Demanding 
insurance 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
T-Test 
No (N=99) 3.7 3.4 Years of schooling of head’s 
wife Yes  (N=121) 4.8 3.3 -2.348** 
No (N=103) 253,000 397,000 Fodder cost/pig/HH/year in 
VND Yes  (N=125) 464,000 912,000 -2.334** 
No (N=103) 29,800 45,800 Fodder cost/pig/HH/year in 
VND Yes  (N=125) 46,400 88,200 -1.826* 
No (N=103) 265,000 400,000 Total (vet + fodder) 
cost/HH/year in VND Yes  (N=124) 486,000 924,000 -2.409** 
No (N=102) 31,700 46,200 Total (vet + fodder) 
cost/pig/HH/year in VND  Yes  (N=124) 50,200 31,700 -1.989** 
Note: N is different due to missing values and sub-samples. 
 * Significant at 10% level, ** significant 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. 
The following variables were tested but did not show significant results: wealth group, cash revenue 
total, cash revenue from livestock production, percentage of livestock production from total cash 
revenue, market visits per month, distance to district capital, total farm size with forest land, farm size 
without forest land, paddy rice area, loss of pigs in VND and per animals kept, years of schooling of 
household head, numbers of pigs, and veterinary cost total and per pig. 
 
The wives of household heads in households that demand insurance for pigs are significantly 
better educated. Raising pigs is usually done by the female members of the household. 
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Therefore, more educated women might have a better understanding of the concept of 
insurance and might have fewer inhibitions about the formal character of such an insurance 
scheme.  
As expected, households that have access to extension services related to animal husbandry 
demand insurance for pigs with significantly greater frequency. As with large ruminants, this 
could indicate that extension increases awareness of certain animal diseases (Table 7). It 
could also be explained by the fact that animal extension is likely to promote more intensive 
production. Therefore, insurance may be more attractive for these households as they invest 
more in their pigs. This finding is also supported by the analysis presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 7 Extension services for households demanding livestock insurance for 
pigs (Chi-square test) 
Demanding insurance   
No Yes 
Chi-square Sig. 
No 59 55 Extension service for animal 
husbandry Yes 39 66 4.720 0.030 
No 51 43 Extension service for animal 
husbandry or from D2 Yes 47 78 6.020 0.014 
Note: * Because of missing values, N can vary slightly. 
 ** The subproject D2 ‘Efficiency of smallholder animal husbandry (Vietnam)’ offers extension 
services on selected issues relating to pig raising for farmers participating in the project. 
The following variables were tested but did not show significant results: extension general and 
affiliation to ethnic minority. 
 
5.1.3 Demand for credit in combination with livestock insurance (CA) 
Utility is a measure of relative desirability or worth. When computing utilities using logit, 
every attribute level is assigned a utility (also referred to as part-worth). The higher the utility, 
the more desirable the attribute level. The relative attractiveness of a concept can be assessed 
by adding up the utilities for its component attribute levels (total utility). Utilities cannot be 
compared directly between different attributes or between different market segments. 
Therefore, the relative importance of each attribute is calculated to enable comparisons 
between attributes.26 
Cohen and Sebstad (1999) state that, in general, the rural population has a particularly 
pronounced desire to ensure debt-financed investments. However, empirical research in 
Northern Vietnam has shown that the most important credit attribute is still the interest rate. 
This strong focus on interest rates may be explained by the fact that rural Vietnam has gone 
through a decade of continuous reductions in real interest rates and a history of public 
announcements on the importance of low interest rates for rural development and improving 
rural living. Nevertheless, farmers are willing to pay an extra fee for special services, e.g. 
livestock insurance (Dufhues, Heidhues and Buchenrieder 2004).27 
In Table 8, households are classified by their investment plans for the hypothetical credit 
product offered during the Conjoint Analysis interviews (for details on the concept and results 
of the Conjoint Analysis see (Dufhues et al. 2003) and (Dufhues, Heidhues and Buchenrieder 
                                                 
26 The relative importance describes the weight of each attribute within the purchasing decision relating to a 
service by referring to the difference between the highest and lowest part-worth utility of each attribute level.  
27 The attribute ‘interest rate’ has been excluded from further analysis, as the level ‘0.5% interest rate/month’ 
was chosen in 100% of the cases. 
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2004).28 Two categories were created: 1. loan purpose only for large ruminants and not for 
pigs, and 2. loan purpose only for pigs and not for large ruminants.29 
 
Table 8 Attractiveness of livestock insurance in combination with credit - Logit 
estimation of average utility values for credit attributes, by investment purpose1 
 Planed investment: 
ruminants only 
(N = 149) 
Planed investment: 
pigs only 
(N = 55) 
 All2 
 
(N = 322) 
 Utility 
value 
t-value Utility 
value 
t-value  Utility 
value 
t-value 
Livestock insurance    
Yes (5,000 VND per month and animal) 2.297 6.780*** 0.997 4.669***  1.418 10.840*** 
No -2.297 -6.780*** -0.997 -4.669***  -1.418 -10.840*** 
Relative importance in % 21% 8%  19% 
Disbursal time    
Seven days 1.556 5.925*** 7.796 0.157  2.058 8.038*** 
60 days -1.556 -5.925*** -7.796 -0.157  -2.058 -8.038*** 
Relative importance in % 15% 60%  27% 
Lending scheme    
Group lending -1.635 -4.408*** -0.997 -2.735***  -1.191 -6.426*** 
Individual lending 1.635 4.408*** 0.997 2.735***  1.191 6.426*** 
Relative importance in % 15% 8%  16% 
Collateral requirement    
Land use rights 2.093 4.261*** -0.324 -0.833  1.097 5.998*** 
Durable consumer goods -4.217 -5.143*** 0.743 1.014  -1.988 -6.146*** 
No collateral 2.123 3.749*** -0.419 -0.901  0.891 3.879*** 
Relative importance in % 30% 4%  20% 
Location of credit negotiation, disbursal    
District -2.181 -4.342*** 0.324 0.833  -1.151 -5.910*** 
Commune 0.219 0.443*** -2.736 -2.894***  -0.554 -1.891* 
Village 1.962 5.381*** 2.412 3.467***  1.705 7.494*** 
Relative importance in % 19% 20%  19% 
None option / / / /  3.060 8.445*** 
Percentage of households 
choosing ‘none’ option 
/ /  6.83% 
Chi-square 528.164 146.354  892.662 
Note: *Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. 
 1 Due to the small sample size or little variance, the default settings did not yield interpretable results for all 
attributes or the regression model did not converge. Therefore, the default settings were changed to a smaller 
step size between the iterations: 0.1 instead of one, and from 20 to a maximum of 150 iterations. The attribute 
‘interest rate’ was excluded from the analysis, as the level ‘0.5% interest rate/month’ was chosen in 100% of 
the cases. 
 2 This category consists of the categories ‘ruminants only’ and ‘pigs only’, plus all other planned loan purposes, 
for instance households wanting to invest in pigs and ruminants or tree production. 
 
Table 8 shows that, in case of investment into large ruminants, the attribute ‘livestock 
insurance’ is the third most important decision criteria within the household’s decision matrix, 
whether or not to take credit (‘relative importance’ of 21%) after ‘interest rate’ and ‘collateral 
requirement’. This is in contrast to households that want to invest only in pigs. Here, the 
attribute ‘livestock insurance’, with a ‘relative importance’ of eight percent, does not play an 
important role at all. This difference may be explained by the fact that investing in large 
                                                 
28 The different attributes and their levels are explained in more detail in Table 13 in the Annex. 
29 It is assumed that preferences concerning livestock insurance in combination with credit differ for different 
loan purposes. When more than one loan purpose is envisaged, it is no longer possible to distinguish the 
influence of the purpose on the preferences. 
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ruminants is a long-term investment and thus carries more risks over time than investment in 
pig production; in addition, the value per adult ruminant, at around 3.5 million VND, is 
roughly four times higher than for an adult pig.  
5.2 Supply 
The following section introduces different livestock insurance schemes that have existed to 
date in Vietnam, starting with a credit-based cattle and pig insurance scheme and then 
introducing two insurance companies operating in Vietnam and offering general livestock 
insurance. 
5.2.1 Cattle livestock insurance scheme of the Moc Chau Dairy Cattle Enterprise30 
The Moc Chau Dairy Cattle Enterprise is under the direct control of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development and the Cattle Husbandry Company of Vietnam, and is 
therefore considered a state-owned enterprise. Its main activities are the supply of breeding 
cows and dairy cattle to contract farmers and the processing and trading of dairy products. 
The main product of the enterprise is pasteurized milk. On a smaller scale, condensed milk, 
cheese and yoghurt are also produced. The processing plant operates at 80% of its capacity. 
50% of the products are delivered to Hanoi, while the rest is sold locally. In 2002, 429 
farmers were members of the Dairy Cattle Enterprise, 316 of them providing milk on a 
permanent basis. Moc Chau is considered a favorable location for dairy cattle keeping in 
North Vietnam due to its relatively cool and dry climate. Today, the seventh generation of 
imported Black-and-White cattle is kept in Moc Chau and the breed is considered well 
adapted to local conditions. However, the established keeping system would in fact suggest 
keeping cattle genotypes that are better adapted to the hot and humid climate, as well as to the 
limited nutritional base, than Black-and-White cattle, or even higher yielding and more 
demanding Holstein Friesian cows. Thus, the enterprise carries a considerable production risk 
due to the selection of the cattle breed kept. 
The enterprise is heavily promoted by the state. In the near future, it will play a special role in 
distribution programs of crossbreed dairy cattle (Holstein Friesian × (Red Sindhi × Yellow 
cattle)) for resettled farmers (in connection with the hydro power plant/dam construction in 
Muong La/Son La), and in general it is important as point of origin for extending dairy cattle 
keeping and milk production in North Vietnam.   
The Dairy Cattle Enterprise implemented an initial livestock insurance scheme (LIS) in 1993 
in cooperation with the state-owned insurance company Bao Viet. However, the scheme was 
terminated by the Cattle Enterprise in 1995, since the procedure to compensate farmers for 
losses was very ‘complex’, the indemnity was low, and the premium was high. However, 
statements from farmers paint a different picture (Figure 2). According to the statement 
presented in Figure 2, it is reasonable to assume that moral hazard and adverse selection went 
out of control and this resulted in the collapse of the scheme. 
After the first LIS was terminated, however, it was perceived that an insurance scheme was 
still necessary. As Mr. Chien (the director) puts it, “Farmers who want to keep cattle must 
have capital. It takes a long time to get the required capital. Disasters may happen. There is a 
need for an insurance scheme.” This statement shows the preference for credit in comparison 
to insurance. Insurance operations are seen rather as a means of facilitating access to loans 
and protecting one’s credit portfolio. 
                                                 
30 The following section is based on an interview with the director of the Dairy Cattle Enterprise, Mr. Tran Cong 
Chien, and the technician, Mr. Minh, on August 8, 2002, and on interviews with the director on June 16 and 17, 
2003, in Moc Chau. Information was also collected from three farmers, Mr. Duc, Mr. Nha, and Mr. Toan on June 
17, 2003, in Moc Chau. 
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Figure 2 Farmers’ experience with the first livestock insurance scheme of the Moc 
Chau Dairy Cattle Enterprise 
“I took part in the first LIS from 1992/93. In that first period, I was compensated in three cases (two cows did 
not get pregnant and were sold for slaughter; one cow died). At that time, the Dairy Cattle Enterprise was an 
agent of Bao Viet. One person from the Enterprise and one from Bao Viet came to check the cases and to 
identify the reasons of death. They wrote a report, which was approved later on. An indemnity of 0.7 million 
VND/cow was paid after more than one month. The premium at that time was 100,000 VND/year/cow. The 
annual premium was calculated depending on the value of the cow and was equivalent to 10% of the animal’s 
value.” 
“The regulations of Bao Viet for the first insurance scheme were not very strict, so the farmers were able to 
benefit a great deal from the LIS. For instance, farmers paid the premium only for old and sick animals. The 
experience of farmers with cattle production was also very limited, and farmers had little capital for investing in 
cattle keeping. As a result, output from cattle production was low and animal losses were high. In the end, the 
Enterprise could no longer afford the LIS and gave it up” 
Source: Own data 
 
A second, modified LIS has been implemented by the Enterprise since 2001 onwards. 
Farmers who finance their cows using a loan from the Enterprise are obliged to participate, 
while the few farmers who keep self-financed cows can participate on a voluntary basis. The 
insurance contract starts with the first year of keeping the cow and is then extended annually 
on the basis of mutual agreement.31 About 97% of all cattle-keeping farmers in the area take 
part in the LIS.  
The insurance product: The LIS regulations distinguish between ‘normal’ dairy cattle and 
dairy cattle in the ‘Cow Breeding Program’ (Table 9). The latter includes newly imported, 
high-value cattle in a sub-program financed by foreign donors. For dairy cattle in the ‘Cow 
Breeding Program’, the LIS is compulsory as these cows are all financed by loans. The staff 
of the Dairy Cattle Enterprise promote the LIS, trying to attract new clients outside the 
program.  
In 2001 and 2002, a total of 51 claims relating to cows and heifers were brought forward by 
the farmers. However, according to the director, the claims included one heifer, 20 cows that 
had died (due to diseases treated without effect) and 30 cows sold for slaughter (due to 
accidents/broken legs). The death of cows is compensated regardless of the type of disease. 
Accidents are not compensated in cases where farmers keep the cows in areas not approved 
by the Enterprise (e.g. certain upland areas). In 2002, however, only two claims were rejected. 
One is inclined to assume that the normal replacement of an old cow (due to decreasing milk 
yield) is also compensated, although this was not stated explicitly. This would mean that 
farmers receive compensation for each cow. As the Dairy Enterprise is not running at full 
capacity, the insurance scheme may be used as a hidden subsidy to attract more farmers to 
rear cattle on a contract basis with the Enterprise. 
The premium is collected once per year in cash, and it is calculated on the basis of the 
following figures: a) mortality of heifers: 2% p.a.; b) sale of heifers for slaughter: 3% p.a.; c) 
mortality of cows: 5% p.a.; and d) sale of cows for slaughter: 7% p.a. Additional explanations 
given by the director regarding the calculation of the premia were not clear. It seems that 
premia are based on the age of an animal and the estimated mortality at that age, but the 
figures are contradictory (same premium for 3 to 12 year age interval). The director further 
explained that the LIS had just started. There are therefore few data available as a basis for 
calculation (this is not convincing, since the production figures of the enterprise – value of the 
                                                 
31 The three farmers interviewed kept on their insurance contract even after repayment of the principal.  
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cow, longevity, and mortality – should be available on a long-term basis since the 1970s at 
least for Black-and-White cattle). 
The new insurance scheme has been able to reduce the time required for approval of the 
claim, due to integration of the LIS into the Enterprise/its extension system. Thus, the 
employee checking the final claim already knows the case (e.g. if a cow has been sick over a 
certain period of time). The true reason for death/replacement is therefore easier to detect 
(Figure 3). Nevertheless, this can also have severe drawbacks for the impact of extension. The 
relationship between extension worker and farmer may be disrupted when the extension 
worker refuses a claim. So far, this has happed in only about 5% of all claims. However, this 
low figure may also be an indication that extension workers might turn a blind eye on the 
claim to maintain good relations with the farmers. 
 
Table 9 Premia and indemnities under the LIS for dairy cattle in Moc Chau 
 ‘Normal’ dairy cattle Cattle in the ‘Cow 
breeding program’ 
Cow:   
Premium cow (3 to 12 years age) (VND/year) 100,000 400,000 
Indemnity cow, in event of death (VND/year)* 1,200,000 4,000,000
Indemnity cow, sale for slaughter (VND)**  1,000,000 3,000,000
Heifer:   
Premium, > 5 month of age to 3 years (VND/year)*** 70,000 250,000 
Indemnity, in event of death (VND)* 900,000 2,500,000
Indemnity, sale for slaughter (VND)** 500,000 1,500,000
Source: Own data 
Note: *Plus approximately two million VND from the butcher for a cow carcass. 
 ** Plus approximately four million VND from the butcher for a cow still alive. 
 *** There is no insurance for young stock ≤ five month of age, but the enterprise intends to sell 
insurance for this age group in the near future. 
 
Figure 3 Claims procedure under the livestock insurance scheme of the Moc Chau 
Dairy Cattle Enterprise 
A) Sale for slaughter: 
1. The farmer calls the vet to check the condition 
of the cow. 
2. The vet will check whether the cow can be 
treated or if treatment will be ineffective. 
3. The vet gives approval to sell the cow for 
slaughter. 
4. The farmer follows procedure B) – but no post-
mortem examination! 
B) In the event of death: 
1. The farmer makes a claim (i.e. reports the death 
of the cow) to the enterprise. 
2. One of the agricultural engineers checks the 
claim (post-mortem examination). 
3. After approval and a period of 15 days, 
compensation is paid (total time before 
indemnity is paid may be up to one month). 
Source: Own data 
 
Farmers buying the LIS get their animals vaccinated twice per year, and free of charge, 
against pasteurellosis, anthrax, FMD and tuberculosis. Annual vaccination costs are covered 
partly by the government and partly by the Enterprise. Veterinary treatment is paid for by the 
farmers and is not subsidized. Fees and mode of payment are regulated by the Enterprise; the 
veterinarian is an employee of the Enterprise. 
Organization, administration, financial matters: A ‘managing group’ of five people is 
managing/administrating the LIS, consisting of staff members from the technical, 
organizational and financial departments of the Enterprise. The ‘managing group’ is 
responsible for the general and financial management of the LIS. One member of the group is 
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a veterinarian. Further support comes from eleven agricultural engineers working at commune 
level. It seems that each of these persons is responsible for 30 to 60 farms, in the fields of 
pasture management, feeding, and other aspects of dairy husbandry. They ‘identify the critical 
points’ and seem to be something like extension officers and insurance agents. 
To date, the Enterprise has received no technical support from a professional insurer. 
However, the Enterprise has taken up contact with the Son La Insurance Company. The 
Enterprise has no reinsurance. If the total indemnity to be paid on a certain occasion/loss is 
higher than the available capital from premium payments (e.g. in case of an epidemic), the 
deficit will have to be covered out of capital from other branches of the enterprise (e.g. 
revenue from selling processed milk, heifers or breeding cattle, feed; or other services) or 
indirectly from government supplies.  
5.2.2 GRET and its livestock support system  
GRET (Groupe de Recherche et d’Échanges Technologiques) has been active in Vietnam 
since 1988. Since 1996, GRET has tested the creation of various kinds of farmers groups and 
associations aimed at solving technical and market challenges that individual farmers cannot 
deal with alone. As of June 2002, over 200 farmers groups of different forms had been created 
in Phu Tho and Vinh Phuc provinces in North Vietnam, including, among others, veterinary 
groups and pig breeder cooperative groups (Thinh and Geay 2002). 
The livestock support system: The basic principles of the livestock support system are 
represented by a schematic view in Figure 4. Livestock husbandry, especially pig keeping, is 
supported by a combination of a financial support/funding system, establishment of ‘medicine 
cabinet’ farmers groups, introduction of improved management measures (including 
introduction of new breeds) and by training measures. Livestock insurance is integrated into 
the whole approach and can therefore not be described separately. 
 
Figure 4 Rationale behind the term ‘medicine cabinet’ – schematic view 
Medicine cabinet
(veterinary service)
Piglet fund
(purchase of piglets)
Fund for concentrate fodder
(improving nutrition)
Livestock insurance fund
(protecting animal investment)
Improvement of breeds
(introducing better breeds)
Fund for stables
(construction of stable )
Vet/
Para-vet
Source: (Lamballe 2003) 
 
Medicine cabinets: The strong negative effect of pig diseases and losses on pig production, 
especially in poor households, poorly developed or non-existent local veterinary services, and 
lack of extension measures for pig/livestock production were the main reasons for the 
establishment of the medicine cabinets. Members of the farmers’ union (FA) contribute a 
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certain amount of money to establish a medicine cabinet under the technical management of a 
vet or para-vet.32 The veterinary staff play a major role by ensuring communication between 
farmers and project staff, managing the medicine cabinet (sale of veterinary medicines, 
vaccination, treatment of animals), recording data, collecting money, managing funds for 
small credits, and managing the insurance schemes at household level. Nevertheless, the 
management of medicine cabinets is always under the primary control of the commune 
authorities. Locally organized structures also carry a risk: for example, if decision makers of 
the insurance fund are not well trained or informed about the insurance scheme, or if 
ownership is weak, they may make decisions endangering the sustainability of the scheme, as 
evidence from Nepal has shown (CMF 2000a). 
As of November 1998, there were 41 medicine cabinets with 2,536 members in the districts of 
Thanh Ba, Ha Hoa (Phu Tho province) and Tam Duong (Vinh Phuc province). Livestock 
insurance was implemented in some of the communes. By July 2001, 928 farm households 
had taken up this scheme, insuring a total of 1,275 pigs (Dung 2002).  
The livestock insurance fund: The livestock insurance fund was initially subsidized by 
GRET at a rate of 50% (the other 50% was contributed by the farmers). Now, 100% of the 
capital is contributed by the farmers. The insurance fund is used to support piglet treatment, 
but especially to compensate for piglet losses. It helps the households to reduce production 
risks. Livestock insurance is a new activity, introduced for pigs from weaning (age two 
months) to sale (six-month fattening period = age eight months). As the insurance fund is part 
of the medicine cabinet, it is organized and controlled by the vet and the commune officials. 
The mode of operation of the piglet insurance scheme is described in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 The mode of operation of the piglet insurance scheme 
• Each farmer obtaining a credit from the piglet fund has to contribute 15,000 VND into the insurance fund. 
Twenty households with 20 piglets (the usual group size) thus amount to 300,000 VND. 
• The vets use 7,000 to 8,000 VND from the piglet fund to finance vaccination of piglets against swine fever, 
pasteurellosis, leptospirosis, and salmonellosis (in affected areas). 
• The insurance takes effect on day 21 after vaccination; death in the first 20 days is not fully compensated 
(only 50% of the value of the pig). 
• Pigs will be insured for six months (one credit cycle).  
• If one of the diseases occurs against which pigs have been vaccinated, all treatment costs are refunded. If 
another disease occurs, the insurance fund will refund 50% of treatment costs. 
• If a pig dies due to one of the four diseases mentioned above, the farmer receives ten times the value of the 
premium (i.e. 150,000 VND/pig). The death must be certified by the vet. If a pig dies for another reason 
(except poor management), the farmer receives five times the value of the premium (75,000 VND/pig). 
150,000 VND is sufficient to buy another piglet. 
• If a pig dies after the first month of the credit cycle, the credit repayment can be postponed. 
• Money from the insurance fund not used up in one cycle will be used in the following cycle. In that cycle, 
the premium remains the same for farmers. Premia can be reduced when sufficient capital has accumulated 
over a longer period. 
• In the event of the compensation payments to farmers being higher than the collected premia, the solutions 
are a) to use capital from the previous cycle, b) use advance payments from the project, which will be 
repaid by premia of the following cycle, or c) use funds from the medicine cabinets funds. 
• No compensation is paid in the event of death of a pig without clarification of the cause, theft, sale or 
burying without clarification of the reasons, and any loss not approved by vets or project staff. Likewise, no 
compensation is paid if death is due to poor management (e.g. poisoning by cassava or fertilizer, poor 
feeding, etc.), or in the case of death of pigs treated by a non-project vet. Pigs weighing less than eight 
kilograms, non-vaccinated pigs, lactating sows, pigs with chronic disease or malformation are excluded 
from the insurance scheme. 
Source: (Lamballe 2003) 
                                                 
32 The FA gives further support on veterinary and other husbandry issues and supports a system of small credits 
to be invested in livestock. 
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The fund started to operate together with the fund for piglets (for poor households) within the 
medicine cabinet. Insurance is compulsory for all households financing piglets through the 
piglet fund to protect the capital of this fund. Households borrowing from the piglet fund are 
(according to the project requirements) poor by national standards, and it is assumed that they 
may not have the conditions for proper pig keeping. Poor households cannot invest in pig 
production due to scarce resources. This causes additional production risks, however, such as 
buying cheap piglets with a poor genetic background, without vaccination or deworming. In 
addition, poor households seldom invest in feed with a higher energy/protein content.  
The livestock insurance fund also means safety for the para-vets and vets, many of whom 
have limited practical experience, because it assures them against the risk of not treating 
animals properly and thereby causing their death. However, this can result in moral hazard for 
vets supporting animal treatments that are performed quickly and badly. This again results in 
bigger losses for the insurance scheme, thus endangering its long-term sustainability. It also 
reduces the incentive for vets to obtain further training to improve their skills and 
performance. 
Weak points can be summarized as follows: 
• All calculations are based on an assumed mortality rate of 10%, which seems to be too 
low (see Table 3). Insurance premia need to be set high enough to cover future claims. 
Brown (2000a) states that when reasonable historical information is not available or 
where historical averages are no longer likely to reflect future losses, pricing should 
incorporate a sufficient margin of error to reflect the uncertainty in future claims. This 
seems not to be the case here. 
• During the first and second cycles, the fund included 20 pigs. When the number of 
members/insured pigs increases, the quality of the vets’ work may be negatively 
affected due to their non-veterinary related tasks. 
• To date, no non-project farmers have joined the insurance fund, which may be an 
indication of the unattractiveness of the scheme.  
• No money could be derived from the insurance fund to pay for the work of veterinary 
staff, which is a result of point one and may lead to decreasing performance of the vets 
and thereby increasing mortality of the pigs. Brown (2000a) argues that insurance 
premia should be set high enough to allow for the establishment of reserves. Reserves 
are funds set aside each year to protect the insurer against unexpectedly high claims. 
Obviously the premia are too low. The vets cannot even be paid, let alone establishing 
reserves.   
• Until now, the medicine cabinet has not been expanded by additional veterinary staff 
and, up until now, no other vet has used the new insurance system (besides the 
medicine cabinets, where the system was introduced by the project). 
5.2.3 BAOVIET33 
The Vietnam Insurance Corporation, BAOVIET (formerly Vietnam Insurance Company), was 
established by a decision of the Prime Minister in 1964 and started operating on January 15, 
1965, with its head office in Hanoi. After the reunification of the country in 1975, BAOVIET 
took over the business facilities of some insurance companies operating in the former South 
Vietnam, such as the South Vietnamese Assurance Company. Since 1980, BAOVIET has set 
up a nationwide network providing services throughout the country.  
                                                 
33 The following section is based on an interview with Mr. T.V. Cach, General Manager of the General Affairs & 
Legal Department of the Vietnam Insurance Corporation (BAOVIET) on October 21 2003, in Hanoi, Vietnam, 
and on the BAOVIET Annual Report 2002. 
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In 1982, BAOVIET launched a pilot livestock insurance scheme in three former provinces, 
which are currently divided into the following provinces: Ha Tay, Hoa Binh, Ha Nam, Nam 
Dinh, Ninh Binh and Thanh Hoa. BAOVIET was able to use the existing structures of the 
former cooperative system as agencies for its contracts. Through the support of the local 
officials of these cooperatives, it was possible to convince farmers of the advantages of 
livestock insurance. Furthermore, the local officials of the cooperatives supported BAOVIET 
by collecting the insurance premia from the farmers. This kept the transaction and marketing 
costs for BAOVIET low. 
During the process of ‘Doi Moi’, which started in 1986, policy and structural changes led to 
the restructuring of the whole agricultural sector. State farms and agricultural cooperatives 
were mostly split up into small-scale farms. Together with the collapse of the cooperatives, 
the established structures linking BAOVIET and the local authorities vanished. Thus, the full 
cost of selling insurance contracts and collecting premia had to be covered by BAOVIET and 
the demand for the insurance decreased, as BAOVIET raised the premia.  
In 1998, the losses of BAOVIET’s livestock insurance scheme increased drastically 
(indemnities that had to be paid to farmers were much higher than the sum of the premia  
collected). For this reason, although livestock insurance still exists, BAOVIET decreased its 
efforts to sell contracts and the importance of the livestock scheme for the company decreased 
further and further. Today, no livestock insurance contracts are active. 
The main reasons for BAOVIET’s losses were twofold: (1) after the collapse of its broad 
selling system, the pool of insured people became smaller and much riskier, as farmers with 
high production skills and less risky production methods dropped the insurance. This is a 
classic case of adverse selection from the point of view of BAOVIET. (2) The premia, 
previously calculated over a broad pool of clients, were not adjusted to the new situation, thus 
resulting in huge losses. Moreover, it was acknowledged that the agencies put in place after 
the breakdown possessed little knowledge of insurance performance and thus probably 
accepted more claims than was necessary.  
In 1997/1998, BAOVIET, now located directly under the Ministry of Finance, made another 
attempt to offer agricultural insurance and signed a contract with ten provinces in the Red 
River and Mekong Delta to supply the farmers with crop insurance, especially for rice 
production. This insurance scheme did not succeed and was finally terminated two years later 
in 2000 because of massive losses (Dung 2002).  
Nevertheless, a joint study by BAOVIET and FAO confirmed that insurance services, and in 
particular livestock insurance, are in high demand among the rural population. The director of 
BAOVIET states that the two most important preconditions for successful establishment of an 
insurance scheme in rural areas are the existence of a trustworthy organization acting as 
representative of the insurance scheme and guaranteeing the participation of farmers in rural 
areas, and the financial ability of the farmer to pay the premium. 
5.2.4 Groupama34 
Groupama is one of Europe’s leading multi-line insurers and has specialized in agricultural 
insurance worldwide. In September 2002, Groupama started to offer livestock insurance in 
Vietnam and is currently working in 13 provinces of the Mekong Delta. For the future, the 
mainly agriculturally-oriented insurance company plans to extend its business to the center 
and north of Vietnam. Today, there are no livestock insurance companies working in the 
                                                 
34 The following section is based on interviews with Ms Nguyen Thi Bao Tran, leader of the Damage/Claims 
Department of Groupama, Mr. Nguyen Tri Thuc, Director of the Marketing Department of Groupama, and Ms 
Sophie Viard the Director of the Technical Department of Groupama at October 27 in Can Tho, Vietnam 
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north. Vietnam was chosen by Groupama as a test-market for Asia, which is considered to be 
the future market for Groupama, and the establishing of a foreign insurance company was 
easier than in other Asian countries, e.g. in China.35 Furthermore, over 80% of the Vietnamese 
population is engaged in agriculture, so it offers a good market.  
So far, there is a Groupama office in every one of the 13 provinces, each with one manager, 
one secretary, and up to ten agents responsible for selling the contracts to the clients. For each 
contract sold, the agents receive a commission, and the agent who sells 100 contracts will be 
given an extra bonus – a motorbike worth 30 million VND. All marketing and advertising is 
organized by the main office in Can Tho, which provides leaflets and other information 
material to the agents. In addition, seminars are held in the provinces, at which the agents try 
to establish direct contact with farmers and sell them insurance contracts. All in all, the whole 
information transfer is channeled through the agent to the clients and the main office in Can 
Tho respectively.  
Farmers are the main target group, and since September 2002, Groupama has been able to win 
2,600 clients, about 2,000 of whom are farmers in the livestock insurance scheme and another 
600 are people with other insurances. Besides chickens, ducks, pigs, dairy and beef cattle, fish 
and shrimps, it is also possible to insure houses, machinery, liability, boats, as well as 
accidents. In case of livestock insurance, the loss of the animal due to accident and/or disease 
is insured against. Treatment of the animal is not covered. Both idiosyncratic and covariant 
risks (e.g. epidemics) are insured against. The main reasons for losses are diseases; fatal 
accidents seem to happen less frequently. 
In August 2003, due to cheating by customers in the start-up phase and the poor quality of 
public veterinary services (see also section 4.1), Groupama set up its own team of 
veterinarians, who check the animals belonging to the farmer before a contract can be signed. 
The company’s own veterinary service was thus established to control moral hazard among its 
clients. In order to fulfill the contract, the farmer has to follow a specific vaccination 
schedule, otherwise the insurance will expire. In the case of shrimp farming, technical 
equipment and water quality are also checked before the farmer can sign the contract. The 
company’s own veterinary services will surely reduce the number of claims. However, it will 
also raise the operating costs of the company and probably reduce the demand for insurance 
as cheating is made more difficult. Nevertheless, this type of client, prone to moral hazard 
behavior, is better left out.  
Groupama did not rely on data concerning animal mortality in Vietnam provided by official 
departments, which were considered unreliable. Instead, the premia were calculated based on 
mortality data collected during a survey carried out by Groupama itself. Within this survey, 
data on animal mortality were collected from vets in specific regions.36 
The minimum premium per contract is 200,000 VND; the maximum premium is 500 million 
VND (if higher, Groupama has to check with its reinsurer).37 The premia are calculated by a 
rate for the risks as well as the value of the animal. Table 10 and Table 11 give a rough 
overview of the different premia. The premia are collected in cash by the agent for each 
province. There are no subsidies from the government. 
                                                 
35 In the meantime, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission has granted a license to Groupama to conduct 
non-life insurance business in the area of Chengdu, Sichuan province. 
36 Vets are incorporated into the official hierarchy and thus are obliged to record all relevant data including data 
on animal mortality. Thus, every vet is collecting a small time series over the years. These time series plus the 
subjective view of the vets will most probably provide a much better view on animal mortalities in a specific 
region of Vietnam than the aggregated official data (see Section 4.1). 
37 In Vietnam, it’s compulsory to have 20% of the premia reinsured with the Vietnamese Insurance Company 
(VINARE). Therefore, 20% of the premia are paid to VINARE and VINARE will take 20% of the claims. A 
second reinsurer of Groupama Vietnam is the mother company, Groupama in France. 
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Concerning the indemnity payment, the farmer has six hours to call Groupama after an animal 
has died. After that time-span, the Groupama agent responsible has another six hours to check 
the dead animal at the farm concerned. Payment will follow as quickly as possible (max. one 
month later).38 Only a few cases were rejected. These cases occurred due to cheating by 
customers and damages that were excluded from the contract. 
 
Table 10 Premia and indemnities of Groupama for pigs 
 Contract duration Premium Indemnities 
Piglets Two months 66,000 VND/animal 12,000 VND/kg 
Pigs for fattening Five months 33,000 VND/animal 12,000 VND/kg 
Sow and boar 
(group ≤20) 
One year 63,000 VND/animal 800,000 per head or 
market price/kg 
Sow and boar 
(group >20) 
One year 42,000 VND/animal 800,000 per head or 
market price/kg 
Source: Own data 
Note: The maximum weight to be insured is 200kg. After checking of the carcass by Groupama it can be sold. 
 
Table 11 Premia and indemnities of Groupama for cattle 
 Dairy cattle Beef cattle 
Birth-6 months 165,000 VND/animal 110,000 VND/animal 
6-18 months 187,000 VND/animal 82,500 VND/animal 
18-30 months 220,000 VND/animal 110,000 VND/animal 
> 30 months 264,000 VND/animal 165,000 VND/animal 
Indemnity 25,000 VND/kg 20,000 VND/kg 
Source: Own data  
Note: The maximum age for dairy/beef cattle is ten years. The contract is signed for one year. After checking 
of the carcass by Groupama it can be sold. 
 
From the beginning of their activities in Vietnam in September 2002 until the end of 
December 2002, Groupama had to provide compensation in 17 cases. The figure increased 
dramatically from January to October 2003, during which period 874 claims for damages 
were already submitted. It should be borne in mind here that the actual number of damages is 
even higher, as one contract often includes more than one animal, ultimately leading to a very 
high number of indemnities. The total amount of premia collected was two billion VND in 
2003. In contrast, the total amount of indemnities was four billion VND. The director of the 
claims department explained these high losses as being due to the problems in the start-up 
phase of the company. Losses will probably be drastically reduced when new contracts, 
approved by the company’s own veterinary service, will represent the majority of contracts. 
6 Conclusions 
Alderman and Paxson (1992) and Brown (2000b) state in general that the fact that the absence 
of insurance possibilities limits households’ ability to reduce consumption fluctuations does 
not necessarily imply that the most effective intervention would be to set up insurance 
programs. Providing open access to savings and loans may be a preferable method for helping 
clients to manage risk. While formal credit coverage is immense, there is a vast unsatisfied 
demand among the rural population for accessible savings products (Dufhues 2003; Dufhues, 
                                                 
38 Standard claims-processing times for micro-property insurance have yet to be established; however, a standard 
of one to three weeks is likely to be a reasonable objective (Brown 2000a). 
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Heidhues and Buchenrieder 2004). Nevertheless, the literature as well as the authors’ own 
data show that farmers have losses among their animals, hinting at the need for a risk-coping 
mechanism. As the size of the loss increases relative to a household’s expected future income, 
credit products become increasingly ineffective risk-management tools. In addition, not all 
farmers have prompt access to credits to meet their demands, and thus credits as a ‘risk-
coping mechanism’ are not necessarily available when required to compensate for animal 
losses (Dufhues et al. 2002). Similarly, savings products offer only partial protection against 
risks that cause large losses relative to household income. At this point, insurance becomes a 
more effective method of risk management (Brown and Churchill 1999). The stated demand 
for livestock insurance among farmers is high, encompassing 77% of all farmers in the sample 
underlying this research. However, the supply of insurance schemes in the market is sparse 
and relates mainly to small-scale schemes or very limited regions.  
Although there is demand for insuring credit-financed livestock investments (particularly 
poorer households investing in cattle or buffaloes), and there are many advantages in offering 
(compulsory) livestock insurance for rural lending institutes in Vietnam (protecting poor 
clients from risk, protecting lender’s loan portfolio, and earning additional income related to 
the loan portfolio), only sound and financially sustainable lenders should offer microinsurance 
services. The main rural lender in northern Vietnam (VBP) is financially not sustainable and 
is therefore not suitable for offering insurance products.39 The VBARD, freed from policy 
lending and social objectives, might become financially sustainable in the near future and 
could expand its products to include livestock insurance (Dufhues 2003). Nevertheless, it is 
highly recommended to involve a professional insurer into this process by ‘partnering’. The 
most successful partner would probably be a private or foreign insurance company with 
existing experience in agricultural insurance, as the state-owned company BAOVIET was not 
able to offer viable livestock insurance in the past.  
The practice of selling carcasses to the butcher is still widespread in Northern Vietnam. On 
the one hand, the demand for every insurance scheme is negatively affected by this practice, 
as the potential loss for the farmer is much lower. The demand for insurance services would 
rise if this practice were effectively combated. On the other hand, offering livestock insurance 
schemes might reduce this practice as chances of selling live animals to the butcher increase 
due to previous controls by the insurance company’s staff when a farmer make a claim on a 
animal that is still alive. Thus, the LIS could possibly contribute to improving meat quality 
and hygiene standards, but also to increasing farmers’ income.  
One problem plaguing all suppliers of livestock insurance in Vietnam is the limited 
availability and poor reliability of data concerning livestock mortality. Thus, all of the 
schemes investigated calculated their premia based on very limited data. This exposes the 
insurer to considerable risk of setting premia too low and thus endangering its financial 
sustainability. As long as no information is available on the real mortalities of farm animals, it 
is almost impossible to price an insurance product correctly. Conducting small surveys 
oneself (as was done by Groupama) may ease the problem, but this is not a full substitute for 
time-series data. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that demand for the schemes will 
decrease drastically if premia reflecting the real mortality were charged.  
While moral hazard and adverse selection seems to be under control within the investigated 
schemes through the implementation of a strong monitoring system, it is not clear whether the 
cost of monitoring can be covered without raising existing premia. In the theoretical section, 
some cost-reducing alternatives were suggested (e.g. area-based insurance schemes). Area-
based insurance for animal production would insure against epidemics but not individual 
                                                 
39 The VBP was replaced by the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies, which will continue the policy of highly 
subsidized credits and will thus not be able to achieve financial sustainability (Dufhues 2003). 
 33
losses (e.g. accidents). Therefore, combining area-based insurance and insurance of individual 
risks would be the optimal solution. Moreover, a combination of traditional monitoring 
methods with group contracts (using peer pressure) and incentive techniques from MFIs 
seems to be most promising approach for reducing monitoring costs to a reasonable level: for 
instance, offering insurance to a group of people and reducing the premium after each year 
without a claim. 
To reduce vulnerability, insurance should be complemented by efforts to increase savings, 
build assets, and maintain strong social networks. Here, the veterinary and extension system 
comes into play again. Some projects therefore combine insurance with extension and 
veterinary measures in order to tackle the problem from two sides, namely that of coping with 
risks once the animal is lost, and adaptation strategies (to prevent losses by sounder 
management of animal production). Nevertheless, these schemes easily lose their 
transparency (e.g. GRET) and usually have even more difficulties to cover their costs. 
All schemes are still in an early phase of their development and it is to be expected that they 
will undergo radical redesigning, if they continue to exist. For instance, Groupama and the 
Dairy Cattle Enterprise also insure covariate risks such as animal epidemics. This, in 
combination with the unreliable data on animal mortality, expose the insurer to a very high 
financial risk. As Mosley (2001) puts it: “Many micro lending schemes which are now 
household names (e.g. Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) units in Indonesia) only became viable 
through a drastic redesign halfway through the scheme’s life, and it would be realistic to 
expect the same to be true of microinsurance.” 
At the moment there is no insurer in Vietnam offering an area-wide, sustainable animal 
insurance scheme. Farmers would probably not buy an insurance product with a premium 
reflecting the real mortality of domestic animals, the required reinsurance of the insurer and 
the monitoring costs. 
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Annex 
Table 12 Research areas and sample composition 
Selected HHs Research 
project 
Province District Commune Village Ethnic 
minority 
No. of 
HHs  per 
village 
 
No. % 
Dia Linh Pac Nghe 1 Tay 76  36 47 
Nghien 
Loan 
Khau Nen Nung/Hmong 36  19 53 
F2 Ba Kan  
  
Ba Be 
Xuan La Thom Meo 
Khuoi Khi 
Tay 
Dao 
84 
40 
 43 
20 
51 
50 
Sap Vat Sai 
Na Pa 
Dong 
Thai 
Thai 
Thai 
80 
64 
48 
 42 
33 
25 
53 
52 
52 
F2 Son La Yen Chau 
Chieng Hac Bo Kieng Hmong 20  13 65 
   Chieng Pan Than  
Tat Heo 
Kho Mu 
Thai 
38 
16 
 20 
9 
53 
56 
D2 Son La Son La 
Town 
Chieng Coi Ban Buon Thai 75  17 23 
   Chieng An Ban Bo Thai 205  16 8 
  Mai Son Hat Lot Na Huong 
Bo Duoi 
Thai 
Thai 
105 
46 
 16 
15 
15 
33 
Interviewed HHs in total:  324*  
Note: HH = household; * Later in the analysis the N number has been reduced due to missing values. 
 
Table 13 Credit attributes and their levels 
Attributes Levels 
1. Interest rate 
(percent/month) 
1) High (1.2%/month)  
2) Low (0.5%/month) 
2. Insurance of 
investment in 
livestock  
1) Insurance of livestock investment  
(livestock that died due to accident or disease (buffaloes and pigs) will be replaced by 
their value at time of death; premium 5,000/month per animal) 
2) No livestock insurance 
3. Disbursal time of the 
loan 
 
Disbursal time of loan in days from the first day of action to receiving the loan (e.g. in 
the case of the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development, getting the 
application form; in the case of the Vietnam Bank for the Poor, creating the group) 
1) Quick (7 days) 
2) Slow (60 days) 
4. Lending scheme 1) Group lending scheme 
During a group lending scheme, all negotiations with the bank and commune authorities 
will be conducted by the credit group leader. For instance, the application form will be 
filled in by the group leader or the interest will be collected by him. 
2) Individual lending scheme 
5. Collateral 1) Land use rights (Green and Red Books)* 
2) Durable consumer goods 
3) No collateral required 
6. Place of credit 
negotiations and 
information 
All necessary negotiations, credit disbursal, collecting of interest, collecting of principal 
will take place at one of these levels. 
1) District 
2) Commune 
3) Village 
Note: * Land is owned by the state in Vietnam. Nevertheless, the government allocates land use certificates to 
farm households, the so-called ‘Red Books’ for agricultural land (valid for 20 years) and, ‘Green Books’ 
(valid for 30-50 years) for forest land. Farmers are allowed to sell, rent, or pass land on to children 
(Luibrand 2002). 
 
 
 
 39
Recent Discussion Papers 
No. 01/1999 Heidhues, F. and G. Schrieder, Rural Financial Market Development. 
No. 02/1999 Heidhues, F., C. Karege, B. Schaefer and G. Schrieder, The Social Dimension of 
Policy Reforms. 
No. 03/1999 Heidhues, F., W. Erhardt, A. Gronski and G. Schrieder, The Social Dimension of 
Policy Reforms and World Bank Case Studies. 
No. 04/1999 Erhardt, W., Credit for Poor and Low-Income Entrepreneurs in Urban and Rural 
Northern Thailand. 
No. 05/1999 Senahoun, J., F. Heidhues and D. Deybe, Structural Adjustment Programs and Soil 
Erosion: A Bio-Economic Modelling Approach for Northern Benin. 
No. 06/1999 Kyi, T. and M. von Oppen, An Economic Analysis of Technical Efficiency of Rice 
Farmers at the Delta Region in Myanmar. 
No. 07/1999 Schrieder, G., J. Munz and R. Jehle, Rural Regional Development in Transition 
Economies: Country Case Romania. 
No. 08/1999 Hartwich, F. and T. Kyi, Measuring Efficiency in Agricultural Research: Strength and 
Limitations of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). 
No. 09/1999 Hartwich, F., Weighting of Agricultural Research Results: Strength and Limitations of 
the Analytic Hierarchy Process. 
No. 01/2000 Neubert, D., Poverty Alleviation as Intervention in Complex and Dynamic Social 
Fields. 
No. 02/2000 Neef, A., C. Sangkapitux and K. Kirchmann, Does Land Tenure Security Enhance 
Sustainable Land Management? - Evidence from Mountainous Regions of Thailand 
and Vietnam. 
No. 03/2000 Breitschopf, B. and G. Schrieder, The Development of the Rural Nonfarm Sector in 
Transition Economies – Implication of Capital Intensity on Labor Productivity and 
Employment. 
No. 04/2000 Erhardt, W., Urban Bias in Reverse: Have Urban Small Enterprises Been Neglected 
by Policy Makers and Bankers in Thailand? 
No. 05/2000 Senahoun, J., F. Heidhues and D. Deybe, Impact of Agricultural Policy and Food 
Security: An Agricultural Sector Modelling Approach for Benin. 
No. 06/2000 Heidhues, F., Globalisierung, Einkommensverteilung und ländliche 
Regionalentwicklung in Entwicklungsländern. 
No. 07/2000 Heidhues, F., The Future of World, National and Household Food Security. 
No. 08/2000 Buchenrieder, G. (née Schrieder) and I. Theesfeld, Improving Bankability of Small 
Farmers in Northern Vietnam. 
No. 09/2000 Dufhues, T.B., Economic Appraisal of Sugarcane Production in Peasant  Households 
in the Son La Province, Northern Vietnam. 
No. 10/2000 Heuft, A. and G. Buchenrieder (née Schrieder), Decentralisation in Peru’s 
Agricultural Policy: A Critical Review from 1993 to 1998. 
No. 01/2001 Knüpfer, J., Landnutzungsentscheidungen ethnischer Minderheiten im Kontext der 
institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen Nordthailands. 
No. 02/2001 Daude, S., WTO and Food Security: Strategies for Developing Countries. 
No. 03/2001 Knüpfer, J. and G. Buchenrieder, Rural Poverty Alleviation Through Non-farm  
Income in Transition Economies. 
No. 04/2001 Dufhues, T., P.T.M. Dung, H.T. Hanh and G. Buchenrieder, Fuzzy Information Policy 
of the Vietnam Bank for the Poor in Lending to and Targeting of the Poor in Northern 
Vietnam. 
 40
No. 01/2002 Brüntrup, M. and F. Heidhues, Subsistence Agriculture in Development: Its Role in 
Processes of Structural Change. 
No. 02/2002 Alker, D. and F. Heidhues, Farmers’ Rights and Intellectual Property Rights – 
Reconciling Conflicting Concepts. 
No. 03/2002 Buchenrieder, G., J. Knüpfer and F. Heidhues, A Cross-Country Comparison of Non-
farm Rural Employment in the Balkans. 
No. 04/2002 Knüpfer, J., S. Xhema und G. Buchenrieder, Armutsreduzierung durch Einkommens-
diversifizierung - Eine Studie im ländlichen Kosovo. 
No. 01/2003 Dufhues, T., G. Buchenrieder, F. Heidhues and Pham Thi My Dung, Towards 
demand-driven financial services in Northern Vietnam: A participatory analysis of 
customer preferences. 
No. 02/2003 Geppert, M. and T. Dufhues, Visualizing rural financial market research in Northern 
Vietnam through pictures. 
No. 01/2004 Nguyen Manh Hai and F. Heidhues, Comparative advantage of Vietnam’s rice sector 
under different liberalisation scenarios – A Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) study. 
No. 02/2004 Breisinger, C. and F. Heidhues, Regional Development Perspectives in Vietnam – 
Insights from a 2002 Provincial Social Accounting Matrix (SAM). 
No. 03/2004 Basu, A.K. and M. Qaim, On the Distribution and Adoption of Genetically Modified 
Seeds in Developing Countries. 
No. 04/2004 Fischer, I., Media Supported Communication in Agricultural Extension and 
Participatory Rural Development in Northern Thailand 
No. 05/2004 Dufhues, T., U. Lemke and I. Fischer, Constraints and potential of livestock insurance 
schemes – A case study from Vietnam 
 
